The Effects of Creative Destruction on Industry-Specific Productivity Growth:Creative Destruction During Economic Shocks by Siitonen, Wilma
 











THE EFFECTS OF CREATIVE  
DESTRUCTION ON INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 





























































The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of 
Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.1 Background and context of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Research questions and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Limitations and study structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 CENTRAL CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 Labor productivity and creative destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 The components of creative destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Prerequisites of creative destruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Life cycle theory and growth theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Neoclassical growth theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3 Endogenous growth theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Schumpeterian growth theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY . . . . . 46
4.1 The Diewert-Fox decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Alternative decomposition methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Description of the empirical study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Preliminary comments on the industries studied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 Changes in aggregate labor productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2 Structural change, market entry and exit and time interval analysis . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 Export demand and consumption demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4 Overview of the sectoral results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.5 Creative destruction in recessions and the nature of the industries . . . . . . . . . 87
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3 Propositions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
APPENDIX I: SECTORS
FIGURES
Figure 1 The Solow diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 2 The Solow diagram with population growth and savings growth. . . . . 33
Figure 3 Aggregate labor productivity, manufacturing and the computer,
electronic and optical products industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 4 Cumulative aggregate labor productivity, manufacturing and the
computer, electronic and optical products industry (1974 = 100) . . . . 61
Figure 5 Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 6 Food products and beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 7 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Figure 8 Wood and paper products, and printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Figure 9 Chemical and pharmaceutical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 10 Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 11 Computer, electronic and optical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 12 Machinery and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 13 Transport equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 14 Furniture, other manufacturing, and repair and installation of ma-
chinery and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 15 Cumulative aggregate labor productivity in several sectors and ex-
ports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 16 Cumulative aggregate labor productivity in several sectors and pri-
vate consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Figure 17 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in textiles, wear-
ing apparel, leather and related products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Figure 18 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in wood and pa-
per products, and printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Figure 19 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in chemical and
pharmaceutical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 20 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in rubber and
plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 21 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in computer,
electronic and optical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 22 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in machinery
and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 23 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in transport
equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 24 Exports regressed on structural change (between component) in
labor productivity in transport equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 25 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in all manufac-
turing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 26 Exports regressed on structural change (between component) in
labor productivity in all manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 27 Exports regressed on aggregate labor productivity in furniture;
other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and
equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
TABLES
Table 1 Sector classification 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Table 2 Sector classification 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 3 Manufacturing industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 4 Chemical and pharmaceutical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 5 Computer, electronic and optical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 6 Machinery and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 7 Transport equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Table 8 Food products and beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Table 9 Wood and paper products, and printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Table 10 Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table 11 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table 12 Furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation of machin-
ery and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 13 Aggregate labor productivity growth in different industries ex-
plained by exports growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Table 14 The between component of labor productivity in the transport
equipment industry and in the manufacturing industry overall ex-
plained by exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Special thanks to Mika Maliranta, Research Director in the
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) and pro-
fessor of the University of Jyväskylä, who provided me with
the data analyzed in the study as well as for the considerable




1.1 Background and context of study
Productivity and productivity growth have lately become central themes in the Finnish
public discussion. The slowdown in productivity growth has been often associated with
the growth of unit labor costs, and the two have been mentioned as central reasons for
the country’s current economic distress. Among the Western countries, in which the
recent financial crisis has slowed both economic and productivity growth, Finland has
been diagnosed to suffer particularly harshly from stagnant productivity growth.
This thesis studies the dynamics of industry-specific microstructural changes in la-
bor productivity. The data used has been decomposed following the Diewert-Fox de-
composition as presented in chapter 4.1. A shift-share analysis is conducted, in which
the focus is especially on the between component of labor productivity in Finland, be-
cause it serves as the most accurate indicator of the creative destruction process. The
data spans from year 1975 to 2011 and covers the principal manufacturing sectors in
Finland. The study focuses on four different productivity shocks. Two economic reces-
sions, the early 1990s depression and the Great Recession that started from the United
States and hit Europe around the year 2008, are economic shocks that had consequences
of considerable size on the productivity of the Finnish industries.
In a ten years period ranging from 1975 to 1985, Finland experienced a stagnant
phase in terms of productivity, in which its production had become rather ineffective.
This ineffectiveness of the production was compensated by extremely profitable trade
with the Soviet Union, though. (Maliranta 2014b, 17.) In the end of the 1980s, trade
with the Soviet Union had fallen significantly because of a decline in oil prices, and
Finnish firms had to reorient themselves towards the Western markets that were known
as a lot more exigent. Luckily, Finland succeeded in finding new trade partners with
relative ease. (Maliranta 2014b, 31 & Maliranta, Rouvinen & Ylä-Anttila 2010, 82.)
Between the early 1980s and the early 1990s, Finland was transformed in a decade from
a relatively closed economy into a global market economy. The financial system, that
had been both heavily regulated and bank-centric, was fully dismantled and the country
was also opened up for international trade by removing restrictions on capital flows and
exportation and importation. (Maliranta et al. 2010, 80–84.) The first period in which
productivity is studied in this research is therefore already in the 1980s around years
1984–1985 corresponding the opening to international trade and of capital markets that
lead to a productivity shock.
As mentioned, Finland suffered a deep, national scale depression soon after in the
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early 1990s. It was defined as the deepest economic crisis any OECD country had faced
after the Second World War till the time (Maliranta et al. 2010, 80–84). This is the
second productivity shock the study concentrates on. Thanks to the significant changes
in opening to trade and liberalizing the capital markets that had happened in the mid-
1980s, Finland recovered relatively quickly from the early 1990s depression (Maliranta
et al. 2010, 80–84). While the depression left Finland with plenty of unemployment
and especially with lots of highly educated labor force unemployed, the new production
units that emerged thanks to the expansion of the ICT-cluster hired a major part of this
unemployed labor (Maliranta 2014b, 54–58). As compared to the 1980s, the Finnish
economy had experienced huge changes, and the first signs of the technological revolu-
tion had become apparent as companies started to use ICT-technology across the board
(Maliranta 2014b, 54–58). By late 1990s, Finland had become a knowledge economy
located on the global technology frontier and had surpassed the OECD-average R&D-
intensity. (Maliranta et al. 2010, 80–84.)
Productivity growth slowed down in the mid-1990s, after the technological revolu-
tion (Maliranta 2014b, 54–58). This can be explained through the concept of national
competitiveness, which is closely related to creative destruction. If national competi-
tiveness rises to an unusually high level, ineffective companies are able to stay in the
market and even effective firms tend not to commit fully to working efficiently (Mali-
ranta 2014b, 97). Maliranta (2014b, 98) considers that it is probable that the strength
of the creative destruction mechanism fluctuates according to the cost-effectiveness of
Finland, which in turn determines the evolution of exports.
Finland went through a stagnant phase preceding the latest economic downturns in
1995–2005, because its national competitiveness was boosted by a single firm which
turned out to be a growth miracle, the ICT-company Nokia, and the growing technology
cluster that was formed around it. (Maliranta 2014b, 17.) The creative destruction
process that followed was, however, not limited to the ICT-cluster but rather affected a
wide range of different industries. (Maliranta 2014b, 17.) Once the creative destruction
process reawakened, there was also a significant change in production unit structures
in large industrial firms in Finland in the beginning of the millennial, and companies
expanded effective productive units while reducing the size of the less productive ones
(Maliranta 2014b, 39). The ICT-cluster led by Nokia also collapsed in the later years, but
this was not the only affected sector and the problems originated already from the early
2000s, when the Finnish cost-effectiveness had started to decline (Maliranta 2014b,
103). The so-called dot-com bubble that burst out around the end of the 1990s and in
the early 2000s is the third productivity shock the study focuses on.
The period between the dot-com bubble and the global financial crisis, approxi-
mately from 2002 to 2007, serves as a period of reference and is expected to be a period
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of stronger growth. Around year 2008, the recent global financial crisis also known as
the Great Recession, spread to Finland simultaneously with the rest of the countries in
the European Union. Looking at the creative destruction mechanism, years 2005-2011
remind about years 1985-1991 corresponding the previous depression to a surprising
extent (Maliranta 2014b, 17). Both of the periods were preceded by an extremely stag-
nant period, and both periods started economically well and nevertheless ended up in
an economic crisis (Maliranta 2014b, 17). The Great Recession is the fourth and final
productivity shock on which the study concentrates on.
Having reviewed the productivity shocks to be studied, it is necessary to define
creative destruction shortly. Creative destruction is a mechanism, essentially the mi-
crostructural change, that happens between companies in a certain industry. The change
is called microstructural, because the change happens at the micro level between single
production units, and stems from resources being reallocated from less productive com-
panies to more productive ones. As a concept, creative destruction is reviewed in more
detail in chapter 2.1.
In Finland, researchers dispose of high quality, production unit specific data. The
quality of the data can be fully taken advantage of by studying the structure and under-
lying components of productivity growth that are incorporated into it. Unfortunately,
many researchers still content themselves with growth rate statistics originating from
the system of National Accounts, even though this does not enable researching the
structures of economy extensively. Aggregate productivity growth has been found out
to correlate strongly with productivity growth within production units, and this is the
principal structural component that is typically captured when looking at productivity
growth statistics. Productivity growth within production units is growth created by pro-
duction units that enhance their productivity internally by starting to produce products
of higher quality than before or producing more products, in other words in a more pro-
ductive way, in the current facilities. However, it does not account for the effects of
creative destruction this study seeks to examine. Creative destruction is an interesting
mechanism firstly because its effect arises with a lag and secondly because it covers the
changes in productivity caused by entering, exiting and between established production
units continuing in the market. Further reasons to research creative destruction are pro-
vided throughout the study, including in chapter 2.2. In short, there is a apparent need
to produce research that takes advantage of the extensive microlevel firm statistics and
is based on the Schumpeterian new growth theory approach. (Maliranta 2014b, 24–25.)
This is also one of the fundamental reasons for performing this study.
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1.2 Research questions and objectives
Theory suggests that the creative destruction process will be enhanced once technologi-
cal progress augments as well as during, and directly after, economic downturns. There-
fore, the study aims to determine whether there is evidence supporting the assumption
that the creative destruction process accelerates during economic shocks. In this study,
creative destruction is examined around the time of four important economic shocks
in the past years in Finland: the financial shock on the second half of the 1980s due
to changes in banking laws and market competition, the Finnish depression in the early
1990s that followed, the dot-com bubble and technological breakdown in late 1990s and
by the turn of the millennium and finally the recent global financial crisis that started in
2008.
The study seeks to find out the nature of the industries that have lately benefited from
creative destruction as a result of economic downturns and which type of industries
have rather suffered thanks to the recent downturns and not experiencing microstruc-
tural change. It is also equally investigated, whether a distinction between R&D and
ICT-intensive industries as opposed to capital and labor-intensive industries or rather be-
tween industries selling products within Finland and industries selling products abroad
can be made when discussing the magnitude of creative destruction in these industries
under the last few years. The study also aims to find out whether productivity growth
has been reduced principally in a few important sectors driving the national productiv-
ity, which have been affected more than some other sectors, or whether the mentioned
shocks have had effects on all manufacturing sectors simultaneously. The possible ad-
vantages and disadvantages that the recent evolution of productivity has had on the
Finnish industries are also considered.
The following research questions are assessed in the study:
1. Does the creative destruction process accelerate due to economic shocks?
2. Which industries have most suffered productivity-wise from the two large reces-
sions, first in the 1990s and now since 2008, and do these industries exhibit cre-
ative destruction?
3. What is the nature of the industries with strong/little signs of creative destruction?
4. Can R&D and ICT-intensive industries be dissociated from capital and labor-
intensive industries in terms of creative destruction in the periods studied? Or
are the differences rather accounted for by differences in the evolution of their
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target markets, target markets being either international (export demand) or do-
mestic (domestic consumption demand)?
5. Has productivity growth has been reduced principally in a few important sectors
driving the national productivity, which have been affected more than some other
sectors? Or have the shocks studied had effects on all manufacturing?
1.3 Limitations and study structure
The data used is from manufacturing statistics and therefore limited to the manufac-
turing industries and the private sector as explained in Section 4.3. Thus, the results
presented might not be entirely applicable to other industries as such. As explained in
the same Section 4.3, the choice of a geometric decomposition against an arithmetic
or harmonic one, the choice of weighing production units as to their labor input shares
instead of their nominal or real value added shares and the choice of not detrending
the data though often common in the field, are decisions that might affect the obtained
results in a fundamental way. It is equally important to acknowledge that there are nu-
merous decomposition methods of which the geometric Diewert-Fox method have been
chosen, and that the choice of method can also change the results dramatically. As
explained in Section 4.3, ten representative combined sectors were chosen from sixty
different sectors to account for all manufacturing industries, and where then classified
into three different groups. Important to note, the selection of these sectors as well as the
classification in use may have an influence on the outcome. Besides, some limitations
are linked to the choice of productivity shocks studied: for instance, since the financial
crisis is a very recent event and we possess of data spanning until year 2011, only very
conservative predictions can be made regarding the recent financial crisis.
The study proceeds as follows: some central concepts and theory including sig-
nificant recent studies in the field are first reviewed. Having reviewed the theoretical
background of creative destruction and related fields, the decomposition method and
the data are introduced, and the trajectory of aggregate labor productivity as well as of
the different creative destruction components is analyzed during the productivity shocks
in the scope of the study. An additional element, the possible correlation between ex-
ports and labor productivity in certain sectors as well as a second way of classification
are introduced. The study ends with a summarizing Section including several final re-
marks on the findings and some predictions on the development of creative destruction
in the near future.
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2 CENTRAL CONCEPTS
2.1 Labor productivity and creative destruction
There are several different productivity measures, all of which have the same underlying
idea: the productivity of any factor of production is the output produced by this factor
of production divided by the input used to produce it. In this study, the focus is on labor
productivity, which is simply defined as value added divided by the labor input (hours
worked, for instance). Labor productivity can be thought of as the capacity of a firm
to harness the full potential of its human resources. Firms tend to have an incentive to
increase their labor productivity, since it is an very inexpensive way for earning more
profits.
Creative destruction is a mechanism that can be measured through productivity
growth, which can be decomposed in several different ways which then enable studying
the factors that influence productivity growth in more detail. It is necessary to define
what type of productivity is subject to the research. Theoretically, total factor produc-
tivity (referred to as TFP) could be used as a productivity measure instead of labor
productivity. Total factor productivity is the part of productivity that does not come di-
rectly from any of the factors of production in use (such as physical capital and labor)
and it includes intangible assets such as human capital and technology.
Since several measurement issues arise using total factor productivity, labor produc-
tivity has been chosen to be in the focus of the study. Labor productivity has been shown
to correlate strongly with total factor productivity in previous research, and therefore la-
bor productivity can be considered a fairly accurate indicator of productivity growth in
terms of creative destruction. For measuring labor productivity, some simple measure
of labor input such as total number of hours worked Lk,t can be used on the input side.
Real value added based labor productivity can be defined, for instance, as real value
added RVAk,t divided by Lk,t , where real value equals the nominal value added VAk,t
deflated by an industry specific price index. If the study has been directed to total factor
productivity instead, this would get more complicated: on the input side, a nominal cap-
ital and labor cost per industry and per time period would be needed and choosing one
or several suitable deflators would become a lot more complex. (Balk (2016), 16–17.)
Aggregate labor productivity is defined as a weighted mean of the real value added
based labor productivity RVAk,t of all sectors, each of them are weighted with some
factor wk,t demonstrating the relative importance of that sector in question. The devel-
opment of that mean is then studied over time. An additional advantage in using labor
productivity in the study instead of TFP is related to these weights. The weights are a
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lot more complex in the TFP case, because the use of nominal or real cost shares has to
be considered first in order to be able to measure the importance of different industries.
(Balk 2016.) Hence, the evidence found seems to support the idea of maintaining one-
self with labor productivity when proceeding to this kind of analysis. The definitions
introduced in this chapter are also referred to later in the study.
Having reviewed labor productivity, the study next examines the mechanism of cre-
ative destruction. The term was originally launched by Joseph A. Schumpeter in Capi-
talism, Socialism and Democracy, first published in the United States in 1942. Schum-
peter can be considered an economist who was forgotten in mainstream economics be-
cause the ideas he presented have been particularly difficult to express in mathematical
or statistical form. However, thanks to advances in economic methodology and the
availability of production unit specific data, modeling Schumpeter’s ideas has become
feasible. (Böckerman 2001, 74).
Inspired by endogenous growth theory (reviewed in Chapter 3), many Schumpete-
rian new growth models have been created since the introduction of new growth theory
in the 1980s. These models emphasize that adopting the newest technology available
requires previous technology to first disappear or no longer be in use. By adopting
the newest technology firms then enhance their productivity and this enables growth to
be sustained on the economy level. According to this orientation, recessions have the
ability to change the structure of an economy through structural change, which is ex-
ceptionally strong during economic downturns. This is caused by the fact that under
recessions the value of the loss of production, which can be considered as the oppor-
tunity cost caused by reallocating production resources between production units and
between industries, is smaller than when the economy grows strongly. (Böckerman
2001, 74–75.) The underlying idea of this thesis is to find out whether there is actual
empirical evidence of the structural change augmenting during economic downturns.
Schumpeter describes creative destruction as an evolutionary process that is the
essence of economic change (Schumpeter 2006, 82). Thanks to constant changes and
continuous progress in different industries, the economic structure of a sector or an
entire economy is completely transformed from within: new markets appear while ex-
isting organizations develop (Schumpeter 2006, 83). The underlying force, that makes
less productive firms exit the industry and gives productive firms a strong incentive to
stay, is market selection (Criscuolo, Gal & Menon 2014, 9). Presuming that previ-
ous firms and ideas give way to new production units and innovations, the appearance
of new companies and new markets can be associated with creative destruction. Ac-
cording to Böckerman (2001, 78), Schumpeter (1987) describes the innate renewal of
capitalism as creative destruction, in which the essence is exactly in how old structures
are destroyed and give way for new, better structures. For Schumpeter, innovations in-
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clude everything from organizational restructuring, the opening of new markets result-
ing from entrepreneurs’ actions to the development of the financial system in addition to
mere changes in production technology which is traditionally thought of as innovation
(Böckerman 2001, 76).
In Schumpeter’s analysis, creative destruction symbolizes capitalism. First and fore-
most, creative destruction is supposed to maintain the endurance and continuity of capi-
talism, which Schumpeter considers unable to achieve an equilibrium state, because the
structure of economy is under constant change. It is important to note that the concept
has been separated from its original context in its current use and that Schumpeter never
distinguished creative destruction from capitalism nor gave any detailed definition of the
concept. For Schumpeter, creative destruction is the cleansing of the production struc-
tures so that companies with new technologies and production methods replace previous
ones. However, he does not clarify whether he means this from the standpoint of pro-
ductivity. It could be that creative destruction has actually only been associated with
productivity later on. This idea is supported by the fact that when Schumpeter talked
about creative destruction, he discussed about it in the context of the lucrativeness of
firms instead of productivity. However, Schumpeter’s analysis is so versatile that in-
terpreting creative destruction in a simpler, more defined way is more than necessary.
(Schumpeter 1987, as according to Böckerman 2001, 76–81). This study is solely based
on the notion of creative destruction in its current use and is therefore at least partly
unrelated to the underlying ideas Schumpeter had on capitalism.
Creative destruction can be defined as productivity-enhancing structural change in
companies (Maliranta 2014a, 21). Thanks to the creative destruction mechanism, the
productivity of an economy or a sector grows, creating and destroying jobs accordingly
(Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 237). From the standpoint of an economy, creative de-
struction is a central factor driving economic growth regarding both productivity, which
is augmented thanks to creative destruction, and employment, which is also affected
by creative destruction on the aggregate level. Creative destruction is clearly one of
the principal mechanisms forming productivity growth (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011,
234). Not surprisingly, creative destruction is a time-demanding process and many of
its components take time to reveal their final effects (Schumpeter 2006, 83). Empirical
studies on creative destruction have shown that it takes years for the creative destruction
to materialize in the data: for instance, the positive effects of market entry are typically
realized only later in the share transfer component (between component) (Maliranta &
Määttänen 2011, 239–240). Already Schumpeter (2006, 83) pointed out that research
should concentrate on the long-run performance of creative destruction: it is necessary
to look at the process as a whole, and to look at it in time and at the effects the process
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may have in the future. Studying individual elements of the process exclusively might
also lead to misleading results due to the interaction of the different components.
According to Schumpeter (2006, 83), firms’ business strategies depend on their con-
text and future implications and should, therefore, be seen in the role of enhancing
creative destruction in order to create progress (Schumpeter 2006, 83). The problem
lies right here: older companies and established industries, specifically firms in the end
of their life cycle, tend to live in the perennial gale, as Schumpeter calls it, until sudden
situations or general crisis arise and force the industry to make increasing productivity
a priority (Schumpeter 2006, 90). This is practically true on an economy level as well:
in the introductory sector, it was noted that an extremely high level of national com-
petitiveness leads into ineffectiveness in the economy. Arising from the perennial gale
as well as an increase in productivity after it has declined results in unemployment as
well as other losses, but according to Schumpeter (2006, 90), there is no need to try to
maintain non-viable industries in life.
Recapitulating, Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 237) define the term as the mech-
anism in which former products, production processes and production units that have
become inefficient or inadequate to market requirements are replaced by improved, new
products and more productive production units and production processes. Neverthe-
less, Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 237) consider that in terms of terminology, the term
creative destruction is slightly misleading and should be reversed into ’destructive cre-
ation’, because it is destruction that causes creation rather than vice versa.
2.2 The components of creative destruction
Creative destruction was previously defined as the change in microstructures, arising
when new production units enter the market, older less productive units exit the market
and when the production units that have already established themselves in the market
grow at different speeds (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 234). Creative destruction can
be decomposed dynamically at the production unit level as well as statically compar-
ing the productivity levels within a sector. According to the dynamic decomposition,
the decomposition method used in this study likewise, creative destruction can be inter-
preted as the difference between productivity growth of an industry and the productivity
growth of the production units in that industry. It is essential to note that the productiv-
ity of an industry can decrease even though all production units in that industry increase
their productivity. This is caused by positive net job creation that takes place primarily
in production units of low productivity. This situation is a sort of reverse creative de-
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struction, as a result of which industry productivity decreases. (Maliranta & Määttänen
2011, 238–240.)
In this dynamic decomposition, creative destruction consists of four different ele-
ments: the entry component, exit component, productivity growth within the production
units and the share transfer between the surviving production units (Maliranta & Määttä-
nen 2011, 239). The entry component is positive if the productivity of the firms entering
the market in a certain time is higher than the productivity of the firms which were in
the market already in the last period (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239). However, the
entry component is typically negative (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239). This does
not necessarily mean it has a negative effect on productivity: some of the entering firms
are extremely productive and affect productivity positively through the between (share
transfer) component (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239). The effect of entering firms
can also be realized indirectly through the former firms that remain in the market, since
they are forced to ameliorate their performance in order to be able to stay in the market
(Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239).
The exit component is positive if the general productivity level increases after the
exiting firms have left the market (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011). Since the least pro-
ductive firms in the market tend to be the ones that are obliged to exit the market, the exit
component should generally have a positive sign. The size of the entry as well as the exit
component depends on the proportional amount of entering or exiting firms as compared
to the total amount of firms in the market (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011). Measuring
the entry and exit components (and all components, in general) can be challenging since
the measures are extremely sensitive to the quality of the data (Maliranta & Määttänen
2011, 245). To avoid this problem, Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 240–246) compute
the components for different sectors using several alternative data sources and the re-
sults obtained for the entry, exit and share transfer components in different sectors are
very similar to each other despite the fact that the results have been conducted from
different data.
Disregarding the entry and exit components that generally tend to even out each
other, the productivity growth of an economy or a sector can be generated by two dis-
tinct mechanisms. First of all, the so-called within component can be measured by
calculating how quickly production units are able to enhance their productivity under
a specific time period. This is what is traditionally thought of as productivity growth.
However, Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 234–235) consider this method more vulner-
able to measurement errors such as errors related to measuring product quality and to
variations in the utilization rate of factors of production. They consider that measuring
creative destruction and especially the between component, the second mechanism and
measures microstructural change, gives more results in productivity growth analysis.
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Because it measures microstructural change, the between component is also known as
the structural change component, and the size of it depends on the productivity of new
jobs created as compared to the productivity of the older jobs destroyed (Maliranta &
Määttänen 2011, 234).
The structural change component (which may also be called the share transfer com-
ponent, reallocation component, and the between component) is created between the
firms that survive the creative destruction or, in other words, stay in the market after
other firms have entered and others exited (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239). The
share transfer refers to the changes in labor input shares that happen between compa-
nies in the industry due to the creative destruction process. This can be also thought of
as the reallocation of resources between firms that have passed from the initial experi-
mentation and market selection phase to the phase where they establish themselves in
the market (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1082). The between component stems from
the changes in microstructures between production units, of which some grow con-
stantly while others keep constantly decreasing (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239).
The growing firms tend to be firms in the beginning of their life cycle and with high
levels of productivity (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239). More productive firms grow
at the expense of less productive ones, and this enables the industry productivity to grow
faster than if resources had not been reallocated to the more productive production units
(Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1082).
Hyytinen & Maliranta (2013, 1082) research firm life cycles, age groups and labor
productivity. They find evidence showing that the productivity-enhancing reallocation
of resources between continuing production units (the positive effect of the between
component) is mainly concentrated on firms that are middle-aged, ranging from 6 to 15
years old (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1082). They also conclude that rapidly growing,
young manufacturing firms contribute negatively to productivity first through the entry
effect as they enter the market and have a lower productivity than other companies al-
ready established in the market. Middle-aged firms grow relatively fast as well, but have
already accomplished a higher level of productivity and therefore contribute positively
to productivity through the between component. (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1086.)
Therefore, the more significant the between component, the more there are growing,
most likely middle-aged firms in the industry. In industries with lots of expanding,
young firms, the between component is naturally smaller. (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013,
1093.)
As mentioned in the introduction, the between component has received a lot less at-
tention in economic literature than the entry and the exit components of creative destruc-
tion have. Recent studies show that the entry phase and the final phase in a company’s
life cycle last for years on average. Since the entry and exit effect may take years to
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materialize in the data, it is likely that an important part of their productivity-enhancing
effect is captured by the between component. Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 239) also
consider the between component as the most reliable component to study since most
new entering firms do not have a direct effect on productivity (their effect on produc-
tivity is indirect through both the entry and the exit components) and because the entry
and exit components seem more sensible to definitional issues and to how well the data
is able to cover small production units. (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 239.)
Summarizing, the between component seems to be the most relevant and reliable
measure of the microstructural change. It is a relevant component to study, because
it consists of interesting temporal phases and because most of the entry and exit ef-
fects actually show up in the between component. The between component seems to
explain some significant differences in productivity growth in Finland between certain
time periods, between different sectors, between different regions and between different
countries (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 234). It is also reliable in the sense that it is a
lot less sensitive to measurement errors than the entry and exit components and seems
more robust than within productivity growth for which analyzing trends has been found
relatively difficult (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 234–235). Therefore, the empirical
section of the study concentrates especially on the between component.
2.3 Prerequisites of creative destruction
Several prerequisites have to be met in order for the creative destruction mechanism to
be able to function in an industry. First of all, innovations and ideas have to be non-rival
and excludable, as considered in the economics of ideas (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 82).
Non-rivalry means that technology, for instance, can be used by several people without
having to fear about running out of it, while physical goods might run out relatively
likely if used in large amounts. Excludability refers to the fact that technologies have
to be able to be patented, while patents, in turn, make it possible for the innovator to
charge some compensation from others wishing to access the technology in question.
For an entreprise to be able to innovate and then sell this innovation in the form of a
product or service to customers, a functional patent system, an entreprise grant or other
innovation funding system as well as many other characteristics of a welfare state, are
required. Kerr, Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf (2014), who focus on the entering and exiting
units in creative destruction, see creative destruction as an experimentation process.
They identify certain frictions that slow down innovating and experimenting with new
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innovations and business ideas, and list as such the costs of experiments, organizational
frictions, financing risks and decisions of individual investors (Kerr et al. 2014, 35–40).
Since the dot-com boom in the late 1990s, technological change has lowered the
costs of experimenting in both software and information technology, as well as in very
capital-intensive industries thanks to the introduction of new technologies such as super-
computers that can simulate the operation of a nuclear plant or cloud computing. Since
the costs related to initial testing have been reduced significantly, projects that would
previously have been impossible to invest in have become interesting investments. Thus,
technological advances can be considered as a factor that has likely accelerated the cre-
ative destruction mechanism.
Organizational frictions, on the other hand, refer to problems such as the lack of
ability to dismiss unsuccessful projects. This difficulty tends to be common for both
executives and project managers in large companies and for politicians, while external
investors such as venture capitalists are more flexible and understand that when inno-
vating, some experiments also need to fail. In large organizations, this may even lead
to innovating less as project managers try to avoid taking over projects that might fail.
(Kerr et al. 2014, 35–38 and 43.) Therefore, for creative destruction to take place on
the organizational level, testing the project in the first place needs to be sufficiently in-
expensive for the project to be financed and then for innovative projects to be executed,
willingness to take risks and also admit losses when they occur are required.
For innovations to be made, external financing is also often required. The financing
risk is also a funding-related risk caused by financing in stages. Start-ups funded in
stages have to return to the financial markets regularly for a new funding round, and
there is always a risk that projects worth investing do not actually receive capital on
the next round. If they choose to take larger funds at a time, the abandonment options
become less valuable in the eyes of the investor. Projects that need to go back to the
capital markets on several occasions suffer from the largest financing risk and are often
also the ones that have the highest potential value in case conditional on succeeding.
On the other hand, the advantage of the carrying out the experimentation process in
stages is that entrepreneurs and investors can invest in risky ventures in rounds, making
it possible not to invest the full amount at once. (Kerr et al. 2014, 28 and 38–39.) From
the point of view of the ’creation side’ in creative destruction, a market with sufficient
funds to finance new innovations is also required for advances to be made and new ideas
to be created.
The last friction mentioned is related to the decision makers, that themselves also af-
fect investment decisions greatly. Individual investors choose to finance certain innova-
tions, basing their decisions on incomplete information and significant uncertainty. The
actual creative destruction type experimentation happens only was a project has been
23
chosen to be funded, and individual investors are also the ones to interpret the results
in the subsequent financing rounds. This is one of the reasons why government institu-
tions should support innovation when profit-seeking and risk-minimizing investors do
not have incentives to invest in research and development. (Kerr et al. 2014, 28 and
38–40.) Therefore, for innovation and R&D to be sustained at a minimum level and
for some excellent start-up ideas with positive externalities in the society to become
executed, some government intervention is needed to correct market frictions.
Finally, national laws and institutions, meaning both national laws and institutions
and those of the European Union in the case of Finland, have been found to be of sig-
nificant importance in driving productivity growth by creating incentives as well as in
imposing or reducing costs on the ability of private agents to innovate (Kerr et al. 2014,
40). In addition, Bartelsman, Gautier & de Wind (2010, 4) claim that high firing costs
and more generally stringent employment protection legislation could harm both pro-
ductivity and innovation, because it decreases the size of innovative sectors. Therefore,
the easier it is for a company to both hire and fire personnel, the more there will be in-
novation in such economy. For experimentation to happen efficiently, both entering the
market as well as exiting the market has to be facilitated through institutions and govern-
ment action, and therefore laws and regulations concerning themes such as bankruptcy
(and limiting the personal liabilities of an entrepreneur in case of failure without try-
ing to minimize business failure as this may lead to conserving unhealthy projects that
should fail and hindering the creating destruction process) and employment protection
play a crucial role. Kerr et al. suggest removing regulations that complicate entering the
market and remind that governments are more likely to succeed in promoting innovation
by reducing overall experimentation costs instead of investing in individual firms and
ideas (Kerr et al. 2014, 42–43). In other words, the prerequisites for creative destruction
are practically the same as for innovation on a more general context.
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3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
3.1 Life cycle theory and growth theory
Life cycles are studied in several different fields: products, organizations, firms and
industries are considered to have life cycles including a starting phase, continuation
phase and final phase. In this thesis, the focus is on firm life cycles, also sometimes
nominated industry life cycles. The existence of firm life cycles is the underlying idea
behind the concept of creative destruction: firms have to be born, after which they either
grow and establish themselves in the market or exit the market at this point. The firms
that establish themselves and continue their activities also gradually pass onto a final
phase in which they decline. In other words, firm life cycles and industry life cycle
theory simply study firm age and size dynamics.
Peltoniemi (2011) reviews the literature related to the industry life cycle theory in
detail. In industry life cycle theory, several distinct phases can be defined: industry
emergence, transition to industry maturity and industry maturity. Industry emergence
can be associated with new innovations and technologies, frequent entries and exits to
and from the market, population-level collective learning that encourages innovation
and R&D as well as organizational support. In the transition to industry maturity, firms
experience a shift from short-term product R&D to longer term process R&D, and some
dominant design, which is a sort of production standard allowing learning-by-doing
along the production process, appears. The dominant design then leads to increasing
production capacity and market shares being reallocated to the most productive firms or
firms with technological innovations leading to greater product and process standardiza-
tion causing a wave of exiting firms called a ’shake-out’. Another related area of study,
though less researched, is the inter-industry effects. It is known of inter-industry effects
that knowledge and entrepreneurs, among many other attributes, are spilled over from
mature, established industries to new, emerging industries. Mature industries may also
themselves create new, related industries. (Peltoniemi 2011, 350–54.)
It is necessary to note that industry life cycle theory is not the only field of study
assessing firm dynamics: as areas with research on the same theme, Hyytinen & Mali-
ranta (2013, 1080) cite also endogenous growth theory, Schumpeterian growth the-
ory and study of economic development and industry evolution as well as models of
technology- and innovation-based firm entry and growth. As key components making
up productivity growth, Hyytinen & Maliranta (2013, 1081–1082) mention experimen-
tation, selection, reallocation of resources and firm-level productivity growth. In firm
life cycle theory, firms enter the market through the experimentation phase, which was
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considered from the perspective of prerequisites for creative destruction in the previous
section. This phase is also consistent with firm entry as part of creative destruction.
According to Kerr et al. (2014), experimentation can be studied in two different
frames of reference. The first one is experimentation at the economy level, taking place
in market-based economies in which new enterprises compete with the products and
technologies already on the market, and in which the fittest ones survive. The win-
ners are selected by consumers through competition, and the experimentation process
is driven by a promise of large rewards in case of success. New ideas, products and
technologies are continually tested and either succeed or fail in the market. For this type
of experimentation to become creative destruction, the production units losing market
share need to be let to fail. The second frame of reference is experimentation at the
micro level before the above mentioned ideas are able to compete in the market: in the
venture capital market, for instance, few investors choose whether to invest in a new
technology. This experimentation does not function through the market mechanism,
since the investment decisions have to be made by investors with different incentive,
agency and coordination problems before the experimentation takes place in the mar-
ket, and therefore choices made by individuals become excessively important in the
selection process. (Kerr et al. 2014, 26–27 and 44.) Even though this study is related
closer to the typical market-based approach and entry barriers are left out of consider-
ation for the moment, it is necessary to note that the existence of entry barriers might
hinder the creative destruction process very likely.
The second phase of a firm’s life cycle is market selection, which may consist of
an industry ’shake-out’ (a wave of exiting production units, as explained earlier), of
technological competition as is generally considered in the Schumpeterian approach or
of natural selection in its Darwinian sense (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1081–1082).
Market selection is the force that makes less productive firms exit the industry and gives
productive firms a strong incentive to stay (Criscuolo et al. 2014, 9). After market se-
lection, certain firms continue in the market and others have exited the market. In the
next phase, resources are reallocated among the continuing units. The reallocation of
resources may happen in different ways: either through industry evolution, which is as-
sociated with the fittest firms getting to use the majority of the resources in the industry,
the emergence of dominant designs (as described earlier) or the simple maturing of the
industry. (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1082.) When the fittest firms, that are the most
productive ones, gain resources from less productive companies, it is structural change
that increases productivity in the industry. While resources can be reallocated to enhance
productivity through structural change, firms can also grow from within. An increase in
the average productivity growth of a firm can be due to internal restructuring, increases
in or new kinds of R&D efforts, introducing new, more efficient routines, implementa-
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tion of new technologies, catching-up with current technology and imitating firms with
higher initial productivity among numerous other ways (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013,
1082).
In practice, life cycles are often studied by separating firms into age groups. For
example, Hyytinen & Maliranta (2013, 1084) separate firms into five age groups: en-
trants less than 1 years old, continuing units ranging from 1 to 5 years old, continuing
units ranging from 6 to 10 years old, continuing units ranging from 11 to 15 years old
and then exiting units 16 years or more. Hyytinen & Maliranta (2013, 1093) find out
that entering firms have a negative effect on labor productivity. This effect is alleviated
by the labor input share of entering or experimenting firms, which also remains small.
Exiting units, on the other hand, have a prolonged positive effect on labor productivity
which declines over the life cycle. A possible explanation for this is that the produc-
tivity gap between exiting and continuing units has narrowed down over the years. The
contribution of the between component, the structural change the study focuses partic-
ularly on, also seems to vary with age as younger growing firms having a negative and
middle-aged established firms a positive effect on the industry labor productivity.
The within industry growth, which can also be considered as average productiv-
ity growth, is the component that most clearly explains productivity growth (Hyytinen
& Maliranta 2013, 1093), as mentioned in the introduction. Yet, its relative impor-
tance is somewhat questionable, because the relatively old production units also hold
the largest share of industry resources and therefore even if they renew themselves ex-
tremely slowly, this enhances overall industry productivity more than the other com-
ponents do (Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013, 1093). This bias in measuring the different
components also explains why the within component has been studied much more as
compared to the between component, and also sheds light onto why studying the be-
tween component is necessary in order to gain a broader understanding of the creative
destruction mechanism.
Literature on economic growth, on the other hand, tends to start by describing
growth as the explanation for cross-country income differences (see Romer 2012, 6–
8 and Jones & Vollrath 2013, 1–2). The fundamental question that drives economists to
study growth is why are some countries and regions wealthier than others: for instance,
why are western countries wealthier than developing countries (Jones & Vollrath 2013,
1). The same question was already discussed by classical economists including Adam
Smith in the 18th century (Blaug 1985, 35). The treatise for which Smith became fa-
mous focuses on the wealth of nations (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 1). Another renowned
economist in the time was David Ricardo, who studied economic growth in the context
of agriculture and Corn Laws. Together with many other economists, Ricardo brought
up the concept of diminishing returns in the context of agricultural activity. He con-
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sidered these returns were actually diminishing despite technological improvements.
(Blaug 1985, 77). In addition, Ricardo concluded that only rapid technical advance
could ensure continuous economic growth, and that there should be no state interven-
tion to discourage technological progress (Blaug 1985, 133). It is important to note as
well that Ricardo’s model did not actually concern long-run but rather short-run growth,
and with his model he aimed to demonstrate that the Corn Laws did not serve their
purpose (Blaug 1985, 107).
Huge advances have been achieved in economic growth theory since the era of
economists such as Smith and Ricardo. As Jones & Vollrath (2013, 2) put it, "the
modern examination of this question by macroeconomists dates to the 1950s and the
publication of two famous papers by Robert Solow". Solow explicitly modeled how
capital accumulation affected growth and totally revolutionized the field by bringing
forth technology as the one single factor explaining sustained, continuous growth (2013,
2). Solow’s models were developed further on later in the 1960s and in the beginning
of the 1970s, as numerous well-known economists from Arrow to Kuznets contributed
to growth theory. Finally, in the 1980s, Paul Romer and Robert Lucas brought focus
back onto economic growth by highlighting new factors affecting growth, namely hu-
man capital and the so-called economics of ideas. Romer also utilized advances in other
areas such as those concerning the theory of imperfect competition to emphasize the im-
portance of technology as an important input affecting growth. (Jones & Vollrath 2013,
2.) Recapitulating, modern economic growth theory can be divided into two distinct
phases: the period of exogenous growth models, created in the 1950s, and the period of
endogenous growth models, created since the late 1980s. Schumpeterian growth theory
consists of models developed from the first endogenous growth models and serve as the
theoretical framework most related to the concept of creative destruction. Therefore,
the study starts examining neoclassical models, then proceeds onto studying endoge-
nous models and lastly reviews Schumpeterian models briefly.
3.2 Neoclassical growth theory
Probably the largest issue that classical models preceding neoclassical models had was
that they were unable to explain sustained economic growth. Growth had been ex-
plained merely by two factors of production, capital K and labor L, but economists soon
realized that just concentrating these two factors was not enough to explain continuous
growth perceived in empirical data. The previous growth models were perfected by
adding a new factor describing technological or knowledge-based (R&D) growth, often
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denoted with letter A. Technology was first considered as exogenous, and this is why
they are also often referred to as exogenous growth models (as opposed to the endoge-
nous growth models they were followed by). Exogenous growth models are sometimes
simply referred to as the Solow model or the Solow-Swan model, probably the most
renowned single growth model in economic theory. An updated version of the Solow
model based on the presentations of Jones & Vollrath (2013) and Romer (2012) is pre-
sented in this chapter.
The Solow model evolves around two key equations: the production function equa-
tion and the capital accumulation equation (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 22). In the Solow
model case, the production function is often expressed in the Cobb-Douglas form:
Y = F(K,AL) = Ka(AL)1 a , (1)
where a is a scalar with between 0 and 1 and constant returns to scale are also assumed.
The production function describes how inputs such as capital and labor produce output.
In this specification, the output produced in an economy (Y ) is measured as a function of
capital (K) and effective labor (AL). It is convenient to think of output Y as a country’s
gross domestic product (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 21). In addition, it is assumed that the
economy only produces a single, homogeneous good which can be thought of as the
GDP and that there is no international trade (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 21). Effective labor
consists of labor (L) and the technological or knowledge factor (A), which is useful to
have in a multiplicative form as term AL in the model, because the capital-output ratio
seems relatively constant in practice. (Romer 2012, 10.) Jones & Vollrath (2013, 37)
calls A a labor-augmenting term, meaning that technological progress makes labor more
productive.
Note the general property of any function exhibiting constant returns to scale: the
factor payments of the input factors, here labor and capital, use up the entire output
produced (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 23). There are no additional economic profits to be
earned by specialization, meaning that the economy is assumed to be large enough for
new inputs to affect the output only in the same degree than older inputs did. Secondly,
it has to be assumed that other inputs than capital K, labor L and technology A are
of relatively minor importance and can be left out of the model without distorting the
results. (Romer 2012, 11.) Unlike in certain other models, time t enters into the function
indirectly through variables Y (t), K(t), L(t) and A(t), instead of entering the function
directly. As a consequence, for output to grow in time when holding capital and labor
constant, there has to be technological advancement. (Romer 2012, 10.) For reasons of
simplicity, it is denoted Y (t) by Y , K(t) by K, A(t) by A and L(t) by letter L henceforth
where possible.
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The Cobb-Douglas production function (here referred to as the CD-function) was
originally created by Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas already in 1928 (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 22). The production function assumes constant returns to scale, and firms are
maximizing their profits by maximizing the equation
max
K,AL
F(K,AL)  rK  wL. (2)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 23.) The production function (1) can be placed into the maxi-











 w = 0. (4)
The first order conditions yield r = a YK and w = (1 a)
Y
L , which can be interpreted in
such way that firms rent capital until the price of the capital equals the marginal product
of capital r and, respectively, employ more and more people until wage w reaches the
marginal product of labor. Manipulating the same equations yields rKY = a and
wL
Y =
1 a , the share of output paid to capital and labor correspondingly. These output shares
are also assumed to be constant over time. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 23.)
We are often interested in expressing the functions derived above in the form of
output per worker and per capita output. Therefore, y can be defined as equivalent to YAL
and k as equivalent to KAL . Romer (2012, 11) calls this the intensive form. Utilizing the
aforementioned CD production function, this yields the first key equation of the Solow
model:
y = f (k) = ka . (5)
This is the equation later referred to as the production function equation. The first
derivative of the equation is f 0(k) = aka 1, which is positive, approaches infinity as
k approaches 0 and approaches 0 as k approaches infinity, and the second derivative
f 00(k) = (1 a)aka 2, which is negative (Romer 2012, 13).
The Solow model is a continuous time model: nevertheless, primarily the same
implications apply for discrete time as well (Romer 2012, 13). The initial levels of
capital, labor and knowledge are assumed as given and it is also assumed that they
get positive values (Romer 2012, 13). Capital, consumption and population all grow
at constant rates, which induces the so-called balanced growth path (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 38). The population growth leads to the fact that labor also grows at a constant
rate, as does knowledge (population at rate n and knowledge at rate g). As related to
30
capital, investments grow and capital depreciates at constant rates as follows (see both
Jones & Vollrath 2013 and Romer 2012). The second central equation of the Solow
model is the capital accumulation equation. It can be derived by assuming the following
form for the differential of K with respect to t:
dK
dt
= K̇ = sY  dK (6)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 24), where dKdt denotes the change in the capital stock, sY the
gross investment (investment rate multiplied by output) as well as dK the depreciation
occurring the production process (depreciation rate multiplied by capital). Individuals
are assumed to save a constant fraction of their income, sY , and that savings equal
investment (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 25). Regardless of production, the capital stock
depreciates every period with a constant rate d , which is also assumed constant. The
equation above can also be manipulated into the form K̇K = s
Y
K   d indicating that the
growth rate of K is constant only if YK is also constant (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 37).
Taking logarithms of k = KAL yields












Noticing that dKdt /K =
dlogK











(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 39.) The last term L̇L is the growth of labor force which can be
denoted by population growth n so that there are nL new workers each period, that is
L = L0ent . (10)




(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 26.) In the same way, the technology factor A is considered to
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grow at a constant rate g:
A = A0egt (12)




when taking logarithms and differentiating (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 37). In the equa-
tions presented above, the parameters n, g (as well as the parameter s in the capital
accumulation equation) are considered exogenous. The sum of n, g and d , the rate of
depreciation of capital, is assumed to be positive (Romer 2012, 13). Since the growth
rate of a variable equals the rate of change of its natural logarithm and can therefore
be exponentiated, it is assumed that n and g grow exponentially, as presented above.
(Romer 2012, 13–14.)
Expressing (6) in terms of capital per effective labor, the second key equation of the
Solow model becomes:
k̇ = sy  (n+g+d )k. (14)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 39.) This is the equation is later referred to as the capital accu-
mulation equation. Having defined the two key equations of the model, the production
function (5) and the capital accumulation equation (14), the implications of the model
can be studied. The capital accumulation equation states that the change in capital per
effective labor is determined as the difference of two terms, the first being investment
per effective labor and the second term (n+g+d )k describing population growth, tech-
nological growth and capital depreciation per effective labor. Romer (2012, 16) calls
(n+ g+ d )k the break-even investment, which refers to the minimum level of invest-
ment required in order to keep up the current level of k constant (remembering that
k = KAL =
k
A ). Some minimal investment is required because of capital depreciation (dk)
and because the effective labor grows at rate n+ g, meaning that capital has to grow
accordingly, (n+ g)k, to maintain the current level and not to fall (Romer 2012, 16).
Now considering that the growth rate of both capital and effective labor is n+g and one
of the first assumptions that was made introducing the model was constant returns to
scale, it can be deduced that output Y also grows at rate n+g and moreover, capital per
worker KL and output per worker
Y
L grow at rate g (Romer 2012, 17). According to the
Solow model, the economy tends to an equilibrium situation, a balanced growth path
leading to the steady state, where capital, labor and knowledge grow at a constant rate
(Romer 2012, 18).
If the amount of investment per worker in the economy exceeds the necessary
amount to keep the k constant, there will be a so-called capital deepening until a certain
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point k⇤ where sy = (n+g+d )k so that the change in k, k̇ = 0. Accordingly, if the cap-
ital stock is larger than required to keep k constant, the amount of capital per effective
labor declines until it falls to point k⇤. The point where k̇ = 0 is called the steady state.
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 28–29.)
If there is no change in capital per effective labor but capital is growing, this is re-
ferred to as capital widening (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 28). The effects of capital widen-
ing and capital deepening can bee seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Solow diagram
The figure, commonly known as the Solow diagram, determines the steady state
value of output per effective labor, y⇤, as a function of capital per effective labor, k⇤
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 29). The steady state consumption is also shown in the figure
as the difference between sy⇤, the steady state investment per effective labor, and y⇤, the
steady state output per worker (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 29). The curve that reaches the
point y⇤ is the production function, y = ka .
The Figure 2 demonstrates how shocks affect the steady state of the economy. If
there is a shock such as an increase in the investment rate in the economy, the steady
state value of y raises to another point y⇤⇤ as the sy curve also shifts up to a new level s0y.
Capital deepening leads to a higher level of steady state capital per effective labor k⇤⇤
associated with y⇤⇤, a higher level of output per capita. According to the Solow model,
an increase in the investment rate makes an economy richer than before. If, instead,
the population growth rate increases due to immigration, for instance, the (n+g+d )k-
curve shifts left to (n0+ g+ d )k associated with a lower level of output per effective
labor y° and a lower level of capital per effective labor k°. The economy ends up with
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less capital per effective labor and has therefore become poorer than before (Jones &
Vollrath 2013, 30–32).
Countries that have higher investment rates (remembering that investments equal
savings) accumulate more capital per effective labor and therefore will have more out-
put per effective labor, ending up being wealthier than countries with high population
growth rates, that spend all additional savings to keep their capital per effective labor
ratio constant (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 33).
Figure 2: The Solow diagram with population growth and savings growth
The steady state equation for the optimal k⇤ can be calculated by placing the produc-
tion function equation (5) into the capital accumulation equation (14) (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 28 & 32) , which yields
k̇ = ska   (n+g+d )k (15)
















(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 39–40.)
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An important feature to note is that changes either in the investment rate or in the
population growth rate have an effect on the long-run level of output per worker, but
do not influence the long-run growth rate of output per worker (Jones & Vollrath 2013,
40–41). For example, a policy change that leads to an increase in the investment (or
savings) rate first causes an increase in the growth rate, but only temporarily before
growth returns, moving along the balanced growth path, to its initial constant long-run
rate g. However, the occurring change is a level change, meaning that the policy change
can permanently increase or decrease the level of per capita output (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 43). When k (measured as KL ) is constant, y (measured as
Y
L ) grows at the constant
rate g, the growth rate of technology (measured by factor A) (Romer 2012, 16). As
Romer (2012, 16) defines it, if the savings (which can also be considered as investments)
increase permanently, this generates a temporary increase the in g, the growth of output
per worker. It is temporary, because k increases for some time but this increase cannot
last as at a certain point all further savings go into preserving the higher level of k that
has been achieved. For a more detailed description of the transition dynamics in the
Solow model, see Romer (2012, 15–23).
There are numerous empirical applications of the Solow model. In his second article
published in 1957, Solow (1957) introduced growth accounting which enables breaking
growth down into different components: growth in capital, growth in labor as well as
growth in technological change (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 45). The principal outcome
of the Solow model is that the amount of capital accumulated does not seem to have a
significant influence on economic growth (Romer 2012, 27). Differences in investment
rates and population growth rates seem to rather explain differences in per capita in-
come, and countries with a higher investment rate and/or lower population growth rate
tend to allow more capital per worker to be accumulated and thus increase labor produc-
tivity (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 43–44). In other words, cross-country income differences
seem to be easier to explain through differences in labor productivity than in capital per
worker.
According to the Solow model, the only way for economies to grow is along the
balanced growth path leading to the steady state, and growth slows down as the economy
approaches its steady state and stops altogether as the steady state is met (Jones &
Vollrath 2013, 34). In the model, technological progress is the only factor that is able to
"offset the tendency for marginal product of capital to fall". In the long run, countries
are expected to grow at the rate of technological change. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 44.)
Although technology is a central factor in the Solow model and all neoclassical models,
the defect of these models is that technology is also left unmodeled and considered
exogenous and constant (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 79). The concept of some steady state
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to which the economy converges to does not seem to be supported by empirical evidence
either.
3.3 Endogenous growth theory
Endogenous growth theory was created at the end of the 1980s. One of the pioneers
in the field was economist Paul Romer, who wrote a series of articles on endogenous
growth theory, including a paper on technological change that was now considered en-
dogenous, published in 1990 (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 98). The fundamental improve-
ment as compared to the Solow and other neoclassical models was that long run eco-
nomic growth was now determined within the model, thanks to the technology param-
eter that had become endogenous. Intelligent capital also known as human capital was
equally incorporated into the model, which explains why the model is sometimes also
referred to as the ’economics of ideas’.
Many other endogenous growth models were created at the time as well, among
them the so-called AK-model, which turns around a production function as simple as
Y = AK and is completely linear. The AK-model is formally presented by Jones & Voll-
rath (2013, 216–226). While the Solow model represented knowledge and technology
through the effective labor term, endogenous growth models explicitly model knowl-
edge and the accumulation of it (Romer 2012, 101). The variable A can be interpreted
as knowledge from which countries around the world can equally benefit from (Romer
2012, 110). The assumption that technology could grow at a constant rate, as was ear-
lier presented in the case of exogenous models, is purely theoretical. In empirical data,
technology does not seem to grow at a constant rate. The aim of new growth theory
is therefore to avoid the incoherence between the theory and empirical observations by
incorporating technology in to the model.
Just like in the Solow model case, A(t), K(t) and L(t) are denoted by A, L, K respec-
tively, and output Y (t) by Y . It is also noted that A, K and L get positive values and their
initial levels are taken as given. The endogenous state variables of the model are A and
K (Romer 2012, 104) whereas Y and K were endogenous and A exogenous in the Solow
model. To be able to model knowledge in such way, the economy is considered to have
a specific sector (the R&D sector) where new ideas are produced (Romer 2012, 102). A
combined production function incorporating labor, capital and technology such that they
produce technological improvements in a deterministic manner is also assumed (Romer
2012, 102). In the endogenous growth model presented by Romer (2012, 101–134) and
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in several earlier R&D growth models presented in the 1990s, the output is modeled as
a function of time in the following manner (Romer 2012, 103):
Y = [(1 aK)K]a [A(1 aL)L]1 a , (18)
where 0 < a < 1.
The economy has two sectors, one that produces goods and the R&D sector, the
fraction aL referring to the labor force that is used in the R&D sector and the fraction
1 aL referring to the labor force used to produce goods (Romer 2012, 103). aK is the
fraction of capital stock used in the R&D sector and 1 aK the fraction of capital stock
used for producing goods (Romer 2012, 103). Both aL and aK are exogenous and con-
stant parameters (Romer 2012, 103). The production functions of the R&D sector and
the goods producing sector have been simplified and are represented in a generalized
Cobb-Douglas function form (Romer 2012, 102). The equation implies constant re-
turns to capital and labor, but not necessarily for knowledge A (Romer 2012, 102–103).
The capital accumulation equation for the model is equal to the capital accumulation
equation presented in the Solow model case. The saving rate remains exogenous and
constant (Romer 2012, 104). The expression for capital accumulation is
K̇ = sKY  dK. (19)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 100.) In equation 19, sK stands for the savings rate just like
s did in equation 6 in the Solow model case, with the single difference that it is now
explicitly emphasized that the savings rate refers to the savings rate of physical capital.
However, for reasons of simplicity, the form K̇ = sY  dK will be used in the equations
that follow.
Population growth is also considered exogenous and constant and to be positive at
all times and works exactly as presented in the Solow model case equation in (11). In
endogenous models, the focus is on the state variables A and K and particularly on the
dynamics of the growth of these variables (Ȧ and K̇ respectively) (Romer 2012, 111).
A(t) is the stock of knowledge or ideas that have been invented at any time before time t,
making the time derivative of the knowledge factor Ȧ the amount of new ideas produced
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 100). Ȧ also works as the knowledge production function, and
assuming a CD-production function, it can be defined as
Ȧ = B[aKK]b [aLL]gAq , (20)
where B > 0 (and B is a shift parameter), b > 0, g > 0 (Romer 2012, 103). The pro-
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duction function of knowledge, unlike that of capital and labor, is not assumed to have
constant returns to scale: there might be diminishing or increasing returns in R&D, but
it is very unlikely that Ȧ would be constant (Romer 2012, 103), meaning that the same
amount of new ideas would be created each period (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 104).
As was mentioned earlier, there had been advances in the theory of imperfect com-
petition that Romer took advantage of when creating his endogenous growth model.
The variable A is known to have increasing returns to scale (see equation 12), and for
there to be increasing returns on knowledge or innovations, there has to be imperfect
competition in the market that compensates researchers for their research effort. For
comparison, in the Solow economy, there is no remaining output to compensate people
that invest their time in researching. In other words, imperfect competition is abso-
lutely necessary for research to be done and is, thus, a crucial factor making sustained
economic growth possible. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 117–119.)
Whether capital and knowledge modeled in the production function (18) have on the
net increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale depends on their returns to scale
in the knowledge production equation (20). The degree of the returns to scale of K and
A in knowledge production is b +q . This can be seen from the abovementioned equa-
tions: if both K and A are increased by some factor Z in equation (18), this increases
equation (20) by Zb+q . Therefore, whether b +q is greater, smaller or equal to one de-
termines how the economy actually behaves. The long-run growth rate of the economy
is determined in the model, and it is an increasing function of population growth n. This
works also in the way that if there is no population growth, the long-run growth rate of
the economy is also zero meaning that there has to be positive population growth for
long-run growth to exist. (Romer 2012, 103-114.)
Long-run growth is unaffected by the fraction of labor force working in the R&D
sector (as it is by the investment rate s), because aL affects the growth rate gA but does
not affect ġA, the subsequent behavior of gA. This indicates that there is only a level
effect but no growth effect. (Romer 2012, 106–107.) An interesting result, similar to
the results for the Solow model case, is that even though long-run growth is unaffected
by changes in the investment rate or in the amount of population working in the R&D-
sector, policy changes affecting these factors do have a level effect as they affect the
growth rate when growth moves along a transition path to the new steady state (Jones &
Vollrath 2013, 106–107). This is the typical semi-endogenous model case, where long-
run growth is endogenous and rises endogenously in the model, but depends solely on
the parameters of knowledge production function and population growth and not on any
other parameters. The model is called semi-endogenous as growth only seems partially
endogenous in it. (Romer 2012, 114.)
If b + q = 1 and population growth n = 0 instead, the economy does not converge
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to a balanced growth path and stays steady no matter what the initial level of growth
(Romer 2012, 109). The economy can be shown to have one single balanced growth
path, and new knowledge depends on population growth and savings rate, both of which
increase the long-run growth rate if they also increase. (Romer 2012, 115.) If q alone is
greater than one and capital is left aside, a marginal increase in the level of production
of knowledge actually increases the growth rate of knowledge ever-increasingly and as
a result, an increase in aL (labor working in the R&D sector of the economy) has a huge
impact on the in the growth of knowledge A (Romer 2012, 108). In the case that b +q =
1, the intuition considering the effects of population growth is essentially the same. The
economy’s growth rate depends on various parameters and deriving it is complicated.
Because long-run growth is dependent on so many different parameters, this type of
models are called fully endogenous growth models (Romer 2012, 115–116.)
The parameter q itself is the parameter describing how existing knowledge affects
the technological process and the success of R&D in the future (Romer 2012, 103).
q can either get positive or negative values depending on whether previous findings
and inventions facilitate or complicate making new ones (Romer 2012, 104). If q is
greater than zero, research becomes more productive thanks to past discoveries. If q is
smaller than zero, past discoveries make it increasingly difficult to be able to make new
inventions. Finally, if q equals zero, the most obvious ideas are so easy to find that this
offsets the positive effect that previous inventions might have by helping researchers
discover new ideas. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 101.) Romer (2012, 107–109) describes
different cases for different values of parameters q and b more in detail. In the Solow
model case, gy = gk = g holds along the balanced growth path (Jones & Vollrath, 38).
In the Romer model, output per capita, capital per labor and technology must all grow
at the same rate along the balanced growth path meaning that gy = gk = gA (Jones &
Vollrath 2013, 103).
To understand the rate of technological progress along the balanced growth path, it
is necessary to first find out what is ȦA (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 103). Proceeding just as
in the Solow model case, first substituting the production function (18) into the capital
accumulation function (19), yields
K̇ = s(1 aK)a(1 aL)1 aKaA1 aL1 a  dK, (21)











(Romer 2012, 111). Assuming that d = 0 and taking logarithms and differentiating with
respect to time (remembering that K denotes K(t), A denotes A(t) and L denotes L(t))
shows the subsequent behavior of the growth of capital:
ġK
gK
= (1 a)[gA +n gK] (23)
(Romer 2012, 111), where gK(t) is denoted by gK and gA(t) is denoted by gA. Whether
the right-hand side of the equation gA+n gK is greater, smaller or equal to zero deter-
mines whether gK is rising, falling or constant correspondingly (Romer 2012, 111).
Now similarly for the growth rate of knowledge A, dividing both sides of equation




= BaKb aLgKb LgAq 1 (24)
(Romer 2012, 111). Taking logarithms and differentiating with respect to time produces
the subsequent behavior of the growth of knowledge:
ġA
gA
= bgK + gn+(q  1)gA (25)
(Romer 2012, 112). Similarly to gK , whether the right-hand side of the equation bgK +
gn+(q  1)gA is greater, smaller or equal to zero determines whether gA is rising, falling
or constant correspondingly (Romer 2012, 112).
While in neoclassical models population growth n reduced the level of income along
a balanced growth path, because more population meant that capital should also grow
accordingly in order to keep the capital-labor ratio constant, the situation is different for
fully endogenous models. Population growth is actually the key input creating new ad-
vances and knowledge growth, and having more population translates into having more
new, non-rival ideas and can, therefore, be benefited of by everyone in the population.
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 104–105.)
Romer (2012, 143) notes that all knowledge accumulation models aim to explain
growth on a global scale as well as cross-country income differences and also provide
many possible explanations of what determines growth levels and incomes in differ-
ent countries. What knowledge accumulation models fail to explain, however, is the
non-rivalry of knowledge: even though someone uses certain knowledge, this does not
prevent others from using it simultaneously. Some explanations have been sought for in
reasons such as poor countries fearing for their intellectual property rights, not having
access to past inventions and technology, as well as the lack of knowledge to use the
available technology. It seems, though, that the main source of cross-country income
differences is not caused by differences in the level of knowledge or technology in use,
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but rather differences in the factors that allow to exploit the technology. (Romer 2012,
143–144.)
Nevertheless, Romer (2012, 145) considers knowledge growth or accumulation of
technology the main reason explaining economic growth when comparing previous cen-
turies to the present, and that it would be necessary to be able to identify what types of
knowledge are most important for growth and how much as well as how knowledge
accumulates. Romer proposes to enhance the presented endogenous model by introduc-
ing human capital and social infrastructure and measuring not only physical but also
human capital (see Romer 2012, 151–183). This is in line with Schumpeterian models
that integrate innovations in to them, as shown in the following section. Schumpeterian
growth theory is an alternative way to assess endogenous growth.
3.4 Schumpeterian growth theory
Where Romer treated new, technologically incremented versions of previous intermedi-
ate products as new varieties of goods, there is also an alternative specification where
new products are considered the same goods with improved quality (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 98). In other words, alternative innovations completely replace existing interme-
diate goods (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 119). This specification was originally developed
by Aghion and Howitt as well as Grossmann and Helpman in the early 1990s. They
were preceded by Joseph Schumpeter who presented the underlying ideas already in the
late 1930s and early 1940s by introducing the notion of creative destruction on which
the model is based on. Therefore, this orientation in endogenous growth theory is known
as Schumpeterian growth theory (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 98).
Schumpeterian growth theory has both a macroeconomic as well as a microeco-
nomic aspect to it: in addition to merely studying the general macroeconomic structure
of growth, it enables understanding microeconomic issues related to growth and for in-
stance, who benefits and who suffers from innovations and human capital and what net
rents do innovations have. Schumpeterian features in growth are that growth is gener-
ated through innovations, previous technologies are replaced by new innovations and
innovations stem from private investments which are themselves motivated by gains
from monopoly rents. Schumpeterian growth theory evolves around two equations, the
labor market clearing equation and the research-arbitrage equation. (Aghion, Akcigit &
Howitt 2014, 2–4.) Similarly to the Romer model presented above, the economy works
in both R&D and goods production. Namely, there are three different sectors: the final-
goods sector, the intermediate-goods and the R&D sector (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 124).
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Innovation occurs in steps rather than in a continuous manner, and therefore Schumpete-
rian growth deals rather with expected than the actual values. For instance, trend growth
of output per capita is dependent on the growth rate of technology in both Romer and
Schumpeterian models, but in the Schumpeterian case, the trend growth of y actually de-
pends on the expected growth rate of technology, that is to say that gy = gk = gA = E( ȦA)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 120–122). The aggregate production function is similar to the
equation (18) in the previous model:
Y = Ka(AiLy)1 a , (26)
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 120), where the index i stands for a certain idea, a version of
some capital good, with a corresponding level of productivity. Everyone doing research
is working on some version i+ 1 of the capital good i. Aggregate productivity is Ai
(note the subscript i) and depends exactly on the version of capital good i that is used:
for instance, A1 can refer to the one of the first mechanical calculating devices produced,
A2 to the first computer and A3 to a modern PC. In terms of productivity, there is a great
difference in producing the same amount of goods with the productivity Ai or with
the productivity A1+i, and using a capital good xi firms implicitly choose to use the
productivity level Ai (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 120–128).
Since innovations happen randomly, a simple knowledge production function, such
as equation (20) in the Romer model case, can not be written down. The knowledge pro-
duction function has to be divided into the size of innovations (once there is innovation)
and into the probability according to which innovations happen. Let g denote the "step
size", as innovations occur in steps and µ denote the probability any individual doing
research has to discover a new innovation. Note also that g can equally be interpreted
as the growth rate of A from one innovation to another, but not the growth of A in time,
which depends on the probabilty according to which innovations occur. Consider that
L = LY + LA where LY denotes all labor working in the final-goods sector and LA all
workers in the R&D-sector. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 120–121.) Aghion et al. (2014, 3)
call the equation L = LY +LA the labor-market clearing equation, because its states that
the entire labor force is allocated either into production activities or to the R&D-sector.
Now the probability for innovating for the entire economy is:
P(innovation) = µLA, (27)






) = gµLA, (28)
where g denotes the size of innovation and the remaining term the probability of inno-
vating as presented above. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 122). The labor force growth and
the capital accumulation equations are the same as in both the Solow and the Romer
model cases presented, see equations (11) and (19). As innovations are random instead
of happening at a constant pace, there is no exact balanced growth path that could be
specified like was done in the previous cases. However, it is possible to talk about a
balanced growth path with the average growth rate of output per capita (gy) and of the
capital-labor ratio (gk), those being constant and equal to average growth rate of tech-
nological change (gA) as shown in the beginning of the section. In the Schumpeterian
case, it is more common to refer to technological change as productivity, making gA the





can be decomposed into population growth n, the duplication of research effort d and
spillovers f . Note that g does not enter the equation, because even though a larger
g boosts technology more each time innovations happen, the absolute size of A also
grows meaning that each occurring innovation it take longer for the next innovation to
occur, offsetting the positive effect (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 123.)
According to the Schumpeterian model, final goods firms hire labor until their
marginal product equals the wage and purchase capital goods until their price is equal
to what the intermediate goods market charges for them, similarly to the neoclassical
model equations (3) and (4) with the slight modification of replacing L by LY and not-
ing that capital K is now denoted by the capital good xi and its first order condition
yields the rental price of the capital good pi. The intermediate goods market produces
only one type of final good, that has a certain level of productivity. Therefore, inno-
vations have a positive effect on output only if final goods firms actually purchase the
latest version of the good. It actually turns out that the only version of the good pro-
duced is the latest version, since the intermediate goods market charges the same price
for all versions of the good produced. All final goods firms choose to buy the latest
version of the good associated with the highest level of productivity. The intermediate
goods market is monopolistic, meaning that there is only one firm producing a certain
good at a time. The situation is due to imperfect competition, a requirement for both the
Romer and the Schumpeterian model: in the Schumpeterian case, imperfect competition
shows in the market in such way that there is only a single intermediate good produced
at once (which goes into the use of the final goods firms) and this good is produced in a
43
monopolistic intermediate goods firm. This intermediate goods firm holds a patent for
the latest design and has purchased it from the R&D sector. The monopoly also ends up
receiving all the capital market funds to produce the latest version of the intermediate
good. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 126–128.)
In the research sector, on the other hand, all researchers aim to come up with the
same innovation i+ 1, an improved version of the current capital good in the market,
i. In case a researcher manages to come up with a new innovation, he patent sit and
sell it onwards to a new intermediate-goods firm that replaces the previous one. Any
firm producing intermediate goods is constantly under the risk of being replaced, and if
replaced, will loose the value of the entire patent as final-goods firms only purchase the
latest version of the good by definition. This is the essence of creative destruction: pre-
vious firms get replaced by new firms thanks to new innovations. In the Schumpeterian
case, a patent for a certain design will eventually loose its value completely. (Jones &
Vollrath 2013, 124–129.)
The price of a patent can be defined for both the Romer model as for the Schum-
peterian model. In both models, the price of a patent depends on the discount rate that
applies to the profits of innovating. The higher this discount rate is, the lower the share
of labor working in the R&D sector, sR, no matter which one of the two models is exam-
ined. However, in the Schumpeterian model, the price of a patent depends on additional
factors (the mathematical form for the price of a patent of both models can be found
in Jones & Vollrath 2013, 117 and 129). In the Schumpeterian mode, the price of a
patent depends also on µ , the probability of coming up with a new innovation, and g ,
the size of innovations. It making a new innovation becomes more likely than before
and µ increases, At first, if the probability of innovating rises, the share of labor work-
ing in R&D, sR, increases. If the value of a patent decreases due to an increase in µ
increase, however, innovating becomes less attractive due to the higher risk of being
subsequently replaced by another innovation and sR falls. Remember, though, that the
price of a patent also depends on the size of innovation. If the value (and the price) of
the patent increases, the size of innovations increases accordingly. (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 129–131.)
To finally solve the model, it is necessary to first form what Aghion et al. (2014, 3–
4) call the research-arbitrage equation, the second central equation in the model among
the labor-market clearing equation. The research-arbitrage equation practically defines
the wage of the skilled labor working in the final goods sector, wY , as equal to the
expected wage of the skilled labor working in R&D in search for new innovations, wR.








E(wR) = µPA, (31)
where PA refers to the price of a patent along a balanced growth path (Jones & Vollrath
2013, 130). The fact that the equations equal eachother means in practice that the wage
earned from the final-goods sector must be the same as the expected wage in the R&D-
sector. However, one must note that this is the expected and not the actual wage for the
R&D-sector, and that in reality researchers earn either zero or the value of the patent PA,
depending on whether they innovate or not. (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 130.)
Both endogenous models, the Romer and the Schumpeterian model, have the same
result according to which population growth n is essential for long-run growth and that
policy changes can only have level and no growth effects (Jones & Vollrath 2013, 132).
Empirical studies have shown that the positive externalities of R&D tend to outweigh
the negative ones, and that generally the amount of research and development provided
by the market alone is insufficient. For what goes to imperfect competition, classical
theory considers monopolies as toxic for the economy and claims that firms should be
prevented to be able to price at a price point surpassing the marginal cost, while the
economics of ideas (endogenous growth theory) concludes that firms should actually
be allowed to price higher than at the marginal cost since the profits created are an
incentive for firms to fund innovation. R&D activities are also fully dependent on prop-
erty rights, which enable the innovators to be compensated for their work by holding a
patent. Social returns of R&D also seem greater than private returns, meaning that it
is still worth investing in creating new mechanisms fostering more and more research.
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 134–136.) The results provided by the model are in line with
the prerequisites for creative destruction listed in Section 2.3.
Both Aghion et al. (2014, 1) and Jones & Vollrath (2013, 132) see the Schumpeterian
approach to growth theory as advantageous as compared to previous models because it
is able to combine growth to firm dynamics as well as growth to industrial organization.
The Schumpeterian model differs from the Romer model in the specification of the share
of labor sR working in R&D (note that this is denoted by aL in the previous section).
The difference lies actually in the level of income per capita which is created through
a difference in sR. The Schumpeterian model will provide a higher or lower share of
labor engaged in R&D activities depending on the rate by which profits are discounted.
Put otherwise, it is the way how individuals value the possible gains of innovation as
opposed to the risk of not being able to come up with an innovation from which they can
profit from. This can be interpreted as the sensitivity of individuals to either the ’creation
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side’ or the ’destruction side’ of the creative destruction process. Regardless of which
of the two models is selected, the general results that policy changes have merely level
and no growth effects and that long-run growth depends on population growth n hold.
(Jones & Vollrath 2013, 132.)
In addition, endogenous growth models account for imperfect competition like men-
tioned previously. Competition tends to correlate positively with growth, and R&D-
intensive industries tend to be associated with higher rates of job creation and job de-
struction (Aghion et al. 2014, 1), which also serves as a theoretic starting point for this
study as the aim is to find out whether R&D-intensive industries have experienced more
structural change that other industries in the past years, like the theory seems to predict.
Schumpeterian growth theory focuses on long-term technological waves and might even
explain the occurring productivity slowdown by providing an explanation for why these
waves seem to increase the flow of firm entry and exit (Aghion et al. 2014, 1). Another
important aspect is the concept of step-by-step innovation, which seems to fit empirical
data a lot better than constant innovation (such as in the Romer model) would. Aghion
et al. (2014, 6) consider that in sectors with initially little competition, more competition
leads to innovations and productivity growth, whereas it has less positive or sometimes
even negative effects in sectors with tough competition. The Schumpeterian model also
grasps the idea of knowledge spillovers, meaning that technological advances and infor-
mation spread in a way that makes it possible for current innovators to exploit the find-
ings of previous innovators. Current innovators are expected to have a positive spillover
effect on subsequent innovators but they are also expected to drive out older technolo-
gies, and this is a phenomenon called the escape competition effect (Aghion et al. 2014,
7). Competition has a central influence also on sectors with less intense competition,
as in these sectors competition can even discourage innovating in stagnated companies
that merely seek for short-term results since they do not have the need to become market
leaders. This, in turn, is called the Schumpeterian effect. (Aghion et al. 2014, 7.)
Lastly, Schumpeterian growth theory also addresses the so-called catching-up effect
meaning that economies with low levels of innovation and located far from the global
technology frontier tend to grow faster than economies with a high level of innovation.
In the long run, the economies with little innovation tend to fall behind the frontier, but
nevertheless grow at the rate of the frontier thanks to knowledge spillovers. However,
the sources of growth in economies with little innovation are necessarily not at all the
same as the sources for particular sectors or countries experiencing a lot of creative
destruction, and also institutions that enhance growth seem more efficient in the frontier
economies. (Aghion et al. 2014, 20–21.) In this study, our main focus is studying
creative destruction from the point of view of a single, small industrialized country,
which can be assumed to be located rather close to the global technology frontier.
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4 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE
EMPIRICAL STUDY
4.1 The Diewert-Fox decomposition
There are numerous different decomposition formulas that can be used, and the choice
of formula seems to affect labor productivity growth to such extent that different sectors
may seem to drive growth under a certain period using different decompositions. They
can be classified into arithmetic, geometric and harmonic decompositions. Balk (2016)
reviews a large scale of different methods. He compares five arithmetic decomposition
methods, the first four of them which are asymmetric and the fifth being symmetric. The
comparison is done by the help of an arbitrary scalar a, and as different methods have a
different reasonable choice for the value of a depending on the decomposition, and the
value then affects the net entry and exit effect. Some of the decompositions have been
widely used in literature while others are not known to have any empirical applications.
(Balk 2016, 28–39.)
All of the arithmetic decompositions presented by Balk (2016) are based on the
following equation:





(Balk 2016, 29.) k denotes the set of production units operating at the period in question,
k a single productivity unit (expressly a firm), superscripts t   1 and t refer to time
periods t  1 and t accordingly. PRODk,t is the index corresponding the productivity of
a production unit at period t and PRODt the aggregate productivity level at period t. w
is a weight given to each production unit k and measuring the relative size or importance
of the unit, and the weights add up to 1 on all periods. Production units in period t  1
cover both continuing units (Ct,t 1) and exiting units (Xt 1) so that kt 1 =Ct,t 1[Xt 1,
and production units in period t cover continuing units as well as entering units (Nt) so
that kt = Ct,t 1 [Nt . (Balk 2016, 20–21 and 28–29 and Hyytinen & Maliranta 2013,
1096.)
Since the approach that has been chosen is rather the geometric than the arithmetic
approach, the aggregate productivity level needs to be defined as a geometric (instead





This is equivalent to
lnPRODt = Â
k2kt
wk,t lnPRODk,t . (34)
(Balk 2016, 39.) The advantage of using this form is that changes can now be in-
terpreted as percentage changes, since logarithmic changes equal percentage changes
approximately, considering that the change is relatively small (Balk 2016, 39–40). The














(Balk 2016, 29). The first term is the contribution of production units entering the mar-
ket where Âk2Nt wk,t is the labor input share of entering units (defined as in Hyytinen
& Maliranta 2013, 1096), the second and third terms show the contribution of continu-
ing production units (units that have already established themselves in the market and
operate on both periods t   1 and t) and the final term is the contribution of exiting
production units. The two terms in the middle denoting the contribution of continu-
ing units consist of both the productivity change happening within the production units,
PRODk,t  PRODk,t 1, also referred to as the within component, and the relative size
change happening between production units, wk,t  wk,t 1, also referred to as the be-
tween component. (Balk 2016, 29.) The significance of this relative size change which
has been studied a lot less than the within component is also of interest.
The five arithmetic methods mentioned (as presented in Balk 2016, 28–38) consist
of decomposing the equation (35) in different ways. Four of the five methods are de-
composed in what Balk (2016, 28–35) calls Laspeyres- and Paasche-type measures, the
names originating from index number theory. The fifth and the only symmetric method
(as opposed to asymmetric methods) is the Bennet-type method that corresponds the
Diewert-Fox method utilized in this study. The methods differ from eachother in how
the terms are weighted: with a Laspeyres-type measure, Balk (2016, 28–35) refers to
weighting a component using base period weights, and with the Paasche-type measure,
to weighting a component using productivity levels of the comparison period. It is not
necessary to choose between the different combinations of Laspeyres- and Paasche-
type measures as what Balk (2016, 28–35) calls either the Laspeyres-approach or the
Paasche-approach can also be chosen. In other words, either type of measure can be
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used for both the within and the between component. The problem that arises, though,
is that a new covariance-type has to be added to the equation, and this covariance-type
term does not have any empirical equivalent as it is an artificial term created due of the
use of a certain method. (Balk 2016, 31–35.)
A related concept is the so-called Fox paradox or monotonicity problem, which
refers to a situation where a productivity increase does not necessarily contribute posi-
tively to aggregate productivity change do to the decomposition in use. It is actually the
between term, the measure of inter-unit relative size change, that might exert a negative
effect on the productivity increase. However, the formula suggested as the solution to
this issue requires setting the entering units and their corresponding productivity to zero
at period t  1 (when these units have not yet entered the market) as well as setting exit-
ing units and their corresponding productivity to zero at period t (when the exiting units
have already exited the market). Because the logarithm of zero tends to  •, there is no
geometric equivalent to the equation proposed, and the study therefore does not address
the matter any further. (Balk 2016, 41–42.)
The data used in the empirical part of this study has been decomposed according
to the geometric Diewert-Fox Diewert & Fox (2010) decomposition method, some-
times also thought of as a compound method and called the Vainiomäki-Diewert-Fox
decomposition after Vainiomäki (1999), who created a similar decomposition in an-
other context several years before Diewert and Fox (Balk 2016, 38). The decomposition
method Vainiomäki first presented in 1999 is an augmented decomposition of another
method based on the Berman, Bound and Grilliches-method already presented in 1994
(Berman, Bound & Griliches 1994), but which had only accounted for the between and
within components. Vainiomäki augmented the BBG-presentation with the entry and
exit components, because he noticed that the entry and exit components could change
the balance of the between and within effects at the industry level as compared to the
plant level conditional on whether entry and exit occurred within or between industries.
Vainiomäki discusses a theme closely related to the concept of labor input shares as he
talks about the share of skilled labor in his article. (Vainiomäki 1999.) Independently
from Vainiomäki, Diewert & Fox 2010 came up with a similar decomposition in their ar-
ticle published in 2010. A related discussion paper was published already in 2005 (Balk
2016, 38). Diewert and Fox focus on accounting for the contributions that entering and
exiting firms have on the industry productivity and on the other hand concentrate less
on the between and within effects (which they call the productivity growth of continu-
ing firms and continuing firm reallocation contribution), the components that have been
seen as more dominant in studies in the past. (Diewert & Fox 2010.)
In the decomposition method proposed by Diewert and Fox, time is treated in a sym-
metric way so that “the industry productivity difference in levels between two periods
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reverses sign when the periods are interchanged, as do the various contribution terms”.
Several other studies have also proposed such symmetric decompositions in the late
1990’s and in the beginning of the millennial. (Diewert & Fox 2010, 2.) The Diewert
and Fox study tackles the idea, an assumption often made in Economics for reasons
of simplicity, according to which there are multiple outputs and inputs each firm pro-
duces and uses instead of just one homogeneous output and one homogeneous input.
Therefore normal index number theory cannot be used to construct output and input
aggregates for each firm continuing in the market, considering that the firm is present
in two time periods, t and t   1. Diewert and Fox propose using the multilateral index
number theory in order to account for firms entering and exiting the market, since they
are difficult to compare with any base observation. Using multilateral index number
theory, the data of each firm’s data in a certain period of time is treated as if it belonged
to a country. Among the multilateral methods that had previously been in use, Diewert
and Fox proposed a new alternative. (Diewert & Fox 2010.)
The Diewert-Fox decomposition can be presented equally in an arithmetic, geomet-
ric or harmonic form. Our decomposition is a combination of the method as presented
by balk Balk (2016, 37–38) and Hyytinen & Maliranta (2013, 1096) and is:
lnPRODt   lnPRODt 1 =4 lnPRODt,t 1 = ENt +EXt +WHt +BWt . (36)
The aggregate productivity change between two periods can be decomposed into the
entry component ENt , the exit component EXt , the within component WHt and the
between component BWt . The components are formed in the following way, starting





























(Balk 2016, 33). The size of the entry component depends on the labor input share of
entering units at period t as well as the productivity gap between the entering and the
continuing units (Balk 2016, 38).
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The size of the exit component is dependent on the labor input share of exiting units at
period t  1 as well as the productivity gap between the exiting and the continuing units
(Balk 2016, 38).













The within component have a positive effect on the productivity change if the produc-
tivity levels (indexes) of the production units increase on average (Balk 2016, 38).


















Continuing units also have another channel through which they can exert a positive
effect on the productivity change: it units that have a mean productivity level above the
mean relative size (or as Balk defines it, above scalar a) increase in their relative size or
significance (Balk 2016, 38).
We have now defined the four elements contributing to the aggregate productivity
change. Equations (36)-(41) are the equations according to which the data used in the
empirical study that follows has been decomposed.
4.2 Alternative decomposition methods
As already mentioned, there are numerous other decomposition methods according to
which productivity change (labor productivity, in our case) can be decomposed into
smaller components. One of the most well-known methods is the so-called OP-method
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that was presented by Olley & Pakes (1996). The OP-method is a static method that
has been a popular choice in productivity literature in the past years, and it evolves
around a covariance component called the reallocation component (Maliranta & Määt-
tänen 2011, 246). The main idea behind the OP-method is to use the so-called within-
industry covariance for measuring the impact of misallocation of resources (see Bartels-
man, Haltiwanger & Scarpetta 2013, 9). Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 240) refer to
the within-industry covariance as the allocation component, which is can be calculated
when creative destruction is assessed through a static analysis instead of a dynamic one.
The purpose of such decomposition is to enable studying themes such as whether
firm age and/or firm size correlate with productivity in such way that larger firms be-
come more productive than small ones, or whether firms become more productive once
they reach a certain point in their life cycle or not (Balk 2016, 42–43). According to
Balk (2016, 42–43), the OP-method mainly consists of rearranging a general relation
already created by Bortkiewicz in the 1920s into a new form, creating a covariance-
term typically interpreted as reallocation. However, reallocation seems to be actually
the mere difference between a weighted and an unweighted mean and is therefore an
artificial term as well. Although Balk (2016) admits the OP-method can be used for de-
composing aggregate productivity, it fails to distinguish between entering, exiting and
continuing firms. (Balk 2016, 42–43.) Maliranta & Määttänen (2011, 246–249) propose
using an augmented method that divides the components into two effects, the direct and
the indirect effect. However, they also conclude that even using the augmented version
the results provided remain problematic to interpret.
It is important to emphasize that the Olley-Pakes method as well as the Diewert-
Fox method are two individual methods among many other options. The Diewert-Fox
method has been chosen to be used both due to practical reasons as well as for the
possible misconceptions the popular OP-method is claimed to suffer from. We disregard
of numerous other methods that could equally be used as the base of such study.
4.3 Description of the empirical study
The following empirical analysis is conducted based on industry-specific decomposed
panel data. The data has been provided by Mika Maliranta and consists of partially un-
published sector-specific calculations that were made as part of a research conducted by
Maliranta & Määttänen (2014). The sectoral data in use has been formed by aggregating
production unit specific productivities starting at the micro level. This is the so-called
bottom-up approach as presented by Balk (2016). In this approach, aggregate produc-
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tivity is a weighted mean of production unit specific productivities (Balk 2016, 17). In
the study, a sectoral shift-share analysis is carried out focusing on the different compo-
nents of labor productivity as according to the geometric Diewert-Fox method presented
in chapter 4.1. The decompositions have been made by taking the logarithms of firm-
level values that have then been aggregated by their corresponding labor input shares as
explained in our Diewert-Fox decomposition section. The values have been multiplied
by a hundred, which means that they can be interpreted as logarithmic percents (log-
%). The values are annual differences, describing the change from the previous year to
the year in question. First, the data has been indexed in order to be able to study the
cumulative effect using 1974 as the reference year.
Since the data is from manufacturing statistics, only the industrial sectors are appli-
cable in our study. Studying the manufacturing industry is reasonable because creative
destruction is more significant as compared to other sectors such as services (Maliranta
2014a, 29). In addition, it is a natural subject of study, because production unit specific
data is available for a longer period of time in manufacturing than for other sectors and
since creative destruction appears to be closely related to national competitiveness while
changes in competitiveness tend to be transmitted into manufacturing more rapidly than
to other sectors (Maliranta 2014b, 36–37). It is worth noting, though, that the service
sector has lately become more significant and could, therefore, be an interesting sector
to study, but that the service sector has to be left out as there is currently no production
unit data specific enough available for such study (Maliranta 2014b, 37–38).
The aforementioned Balk (2016) paper as well as many other productivity related
articles focus on labor productivity based on real value added. Our data consists of
nominal data, and a deflator would be needed in order to study the within component and
investigate how real labor productivity growth within the sectors. A suitable deflator,
for instance, would be a sectoral value added price index. Since the study concentrates
on other components, namely the between component, it is sufficient to leave the data
in nominal form.
As was shown in the chapter 4.1 that discussed the Diewert-Fox decomposition, the
decomposition can be based on either the arithmetic, geometric or harmonic average,
each of which have their own advantages. Among the options, the most relevant op-
tions, that are also used in current literature, are the geometric and harmonic averages.
Since the geometric average is simpler in use and less sensitive to outliers in data, the
geometric average has been chosen to be used here. It is also acknowledged that the
non-logarithmic harmonic average might at least theoretically be a more optimal option
as it attaches better to the aggregate variables in the statistics. However, overall results
are typically similar and the non-logarithmic decompositions include the cross effect
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term of the within component, which might be relatively large and volatile and also
difficult to describe and analyze.
We also acknowledge that using the Hodrick-Prescott filter is a common way to
study the trend component and separate the trend from the cyclical component in cur-
rent literature. However, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter would mean that several val-
ues in both ends of the series should be left out of the range of our investigation, which
is problematic when handling annual data. Using the Hodrick-Prescott filter also re-
quires choosing a certain smoothness parameter l , the value of which remains quite
controversial. Ravn & Uhlig (2002) propose a value of 6,25 where as professor Lanne
(2007) suggests using the lambda value 10 in the Statistics Finland article (published
in the Productivity Review 2007). Since the HP-filter remains a very disputed indicator
in other respects as well and study aims to proceed in a prudent manner, the empirical
study will be performed directly using indexed, but not detrended data.
Because the values of the different components of creative destruction for the public
sector tend to be not comparable in time and comparing incompatible productivity val-
ues with each other might cause a misleading general picture and because the influential
factors behind productivity growth can differ significantly between the private and the
public sector (Maliranta & Määttänen 2011, 235), the focus is on studying private sector
data on Finnish firms. More specifically, the data is industrial statistics. This is also a
typical data source in the field.
In the sectoral shift-share analysis conducted in this study, ten representative indus-
tries are studied on the sectoral level. The focus is especially on the between, entry and
exit components for each sector, which have been composed by aggregating individual
production units. A sector can be defined a group of production units that have activ-
ities in the same or similar fields with each other. In the case of productivity analysis,
researchers are often limited to those sectors with a quantifiable input and output (Balk
2016, 16). Different sectors are of different importance, and the importance of each
sector is measured by a weight wk,t , getting values between 0 and 1 (Balk 2016, 16).
In the literature, there is a lot of discussion on whether these weights should reflect the
nominal value added share, the real value added share or the labor input share of each
sector (Balk 2016, 16). Our data is composed using the labor input share of each sector.
A typical outcome of shift-share analysis is a table that shows relatively precise de-
composition results compared both between sectors and in time. This way of measuring
the components enables studying sectors with certain particularities, such as studying
strictly regulated or ICT-intensive sectors. (Balk 2016, 16). According to current re-
search, the creative destruction process is firmest in industries in which employment
decreases rapidly, in industries with a lot of research and development (R&D) activi-
ties, and in industries with a lot of experts and executives, that is to say firms with a lot
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of intellectual capital (Maliranta 2014a, 32–36). Intellectual capital affects the output
only after a certain delay. This also supports the idea that firms can enhance their future
productivity by investing in innovation, research and highly educated professionals.
The data is annual panel data conform to the European statistical classifica-
tion NACE (originating from the French term Nomenclature Statistique des Activités
Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne, the statistical classification of eco-
nomic activities in the European community), revision 2. The data concerns the Finnish
the manufacturing industry, and ten representative combined sectors have been chosen
to be examined more in detail in this study. In the beginning, there were 60 different
manufacturing sectors and combinations of sectors ranging all the way from the food
industry to the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and
equipment industry, classified according to the NACE 2-classification (manufacturing
sectors from 10 to 33). Of those sectors, ten representative combined sectors were then
chosen to account for all manufacturing sectors (10–33).
The sectors chosen include the following: food products and beverages (NACE
sectors 10–11), textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products (NACE sectors
13–15), wood and paper products, and printing (NACE sectors 16–18), chemical and
pharmaceutical products (NACE sectors 20–21), rubber and plastics products, and other
non-metallic mineral products (NACE sectors 22–23), computer, electronic and optical
products (NACE sector 26), machinery and equipment (NACE sectors 26–28), trans-
port equipment (NACE sectors 29–30), furniture; other manufacturing; repair and in-
stallation of machinery and equipment (NACE sectors 31–33) as well as all sectors in
manufacturing combined (all NACE sectors from 10 to 33). The data used covers all
establishments in the manufacturing industries employing five or more people.
We also aim to concentrate on the nature of different sectors, classifying them as pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, the chemical and pharmaceutical products, machin-
ery and equipment, transport equipment and computer, electronic and optical products
industries are all innovative, and therefore R&D-intensive sectors, that require plenty of
capital in order to function. Therefore, they are classified as capital and R&D-intensive
sectors. The reason why both computer, electronic and optical products (NACE sec-
tor 26) and machinery and equipment (NACE sectors 26–28) have both been chosen
to be representative sectors lies in the particularity of computer, electronic and optical
products: the computer, electronic and optical products industry differs from all other
manufacturing industries and could also be classified as an ICT-intensive sector. It has
thus been separated from the machinery and equipment industry in order to be able to
distinguish the differences between the computer products industry and other industries
within machinery and equipment.
The food products and beverages industry is a typical capital-intensive sector that is
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Table 1: Sector classification 1
Capital and R&D-intensive sectors • Chemical and pharmaceutical products
(NACE 20–21)
• Computer, electronic and optical
products (NACE 26)
• Machinery and equipment
(NACE 26–28)
• Transport equipment (NACE 29–30)
Capital but not R&D-intensive • Food products and beverages
sectors (NACE 10–11)
• Wood and paper products, and printing
(NACE 16–18)
• Rubber and plastics products, and other
non-metallic mineral products
(NACE 22–23)
labor-intensive sectors • Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and
related products (NACE 13–15)
• Furniture, other manufacturing; repair
and installation of machinery and
equipment (NACE 31–33)
rather concentrated in capital than in labor and which has a relatively low rate of inno-
vation. Wood and paper products, and printing, as well as rubber and plastics products
and other non-metallic mineral products, are also typical examples of sectors requiring
an important amount of capital. The sectors of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and
related products are typical labor-intensive industries with a declining employment rate
and that should therefore experience more creative destruction than other sectors in gen-
eral (Maliranta 2014a, 32). Equally labor-intensive are furniture, other manufacturing;
repair and installation of machinery and equipment as well as repair and installation of
machinery and equipment which are all grouped into NACE sectors 31–33. The last
representative sector covers all manufacturing (sectors 10–33), and naturally can not be
classified into any one of these groups mentioned due to the wide range of different
types of industries it consists of. It has been chosen as a representative sector mainly for
comparative reasons, as it is considered a good idea to reflect changes and possible inter-
pretations to the overall progress in manufacturing to the sector, years and component(s)
in question.
It is worth noting that the classification presented is a purely arbitrary one and de-
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Table 2: Sector classification 2
Industries dependent on domestic • Food products and beverages
demand (NACE 10–11)
• Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and
related products (NACE 13–15)
• Furniture, other manufacturing; repair
and installation of machinery and
equipment (NACE 31–33)
Industries dependent on • Wood and paper products, and printing
export demand (NACE 16–18)
• Chemical and pharmaceutical products
(NACE 20–21)
• Rubber and plastics products, and other
non-metallic mineral products
(NACE 22–23)
• Machinery and equipment
(NACE 26–28)
• Computer, electronic and optical
products (NACE 26)
• Transport equipment (NACE 29–30)
pendent on the prior assumptions made in the study. The industries in question could be
classified in several different ways, which necessarily also affects the results to be pre-
sented. Therefore, an alternative classification, yet less common in creative destruction
related literature, is proposed as according to Table 2. Now the sectors are classified
relative to the markets they are dependent on in terms of productivity, grouping them
into sectors dependent on domestic demand and sectors dependent on export demand.
This dependence does not necessarily mean, though, that the production units would be
operating principally on a national scale in the case of sectors dependent on domestic
demand nor that the sectors dependent on export demand would necessarily be sec-
tors operating principally exporting products abroad. Note also that the division of the
representative sectors into sectors dependent on domestic and on export demand is not
definitive, and the final division of the sectors will later be presented in Section 5.3. The
section also shows which sectors are classified as export-dependent and which as de-
pendent on domestic consumption. The chosen final classification is justified according
to the results obtained in Section 5.5.
Other possible classifications have also been presented in the literature. For instance,
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Bartelsman et al. (2010) classify industries in terms of ICT-intensity as well as strictness
of employment protection legislation (EPL), claiming that in countries with strict EPL
the high-risk innovative sectors which can be associated with intensive ICT use are rela-
tively small (Bartelsman et al. 2010, 1). As a measure for ICT-intensity Bartelsman et al.
(2010, 8) use broadband use and calculate the gross job flows (defined as job creation
subtracted by job destruction and then both divided by employment) and employment-
weighted gross firm turnover, also interpreted as entry-exit job flows (defined as fired
employees at firm exit and hires at firm entry divided by employment).
Bartelsman et al. (2010, 8) compare two periods, 1986–1994 and 1995–2004. When
measuring by gross job flows, they were on the same level regardless of the level of ICT
in the firm for the first period 1986–1994, but on the second period 1995–2004, gross
job flows increased to around five times more in the high ICT industries than they had in
the low ICT industries. Looking then at entry-exit job flows, entry-exit job flows stayed
constant for both periods in low ICT industries. In high ICT industries, entry-exit job
flows had increased by 50 % when comparing the first period 1986–1994 to the second
1995–2004. (Bartelsman et al. 2010, 8.) It seems rather clear that the ICT-intensity of
the sector had a great effect on whether new jobs were created and older ones destroyed,
that is, whether there was creative destruction. With the aim of obtaining similar results
in the context of R&D-intensity and dependence on export demand, for instance, the
study benchmarks the idea of examining the data in specific time periods.
4.4 Preliminary comments on the industries studied
In manufacturing, the creative destruction process seems to be reawakening in Finland
since a turning point in 2002. This has been found to be especially visible in the metal
and electrotechnical industry. Another field of interest is the dispersion of productiv-
ity, which has grown significantly in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment.
(Maliranta 2014a, 22–23.) Because the effect of creative destruction is known to have
started to strengthen in the start of the millennial (around the time of the dot-com bub-
ble), this makes the early 2000s an especially interesting time period to study, and also
serves as a good argument for analyzing the electrotechnical and ICT-industry as much
in detail as possible.
Piekkola & Åkerholm (2013) studied the effects of intangible investments on pro-
ductivity. They found out that the effect of structural change has transformed drastically
in the last years, in around 2008, as structural change went from being a factor slow-
ing down growth to a factor actually supporting growth in all sectors (from negative to
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positive). This seems true especially for capital-intensive industries and industries that
have a lot of expertise and know-how (empirical results for this are found in their cluster
analysis, which has been left unpublished). They also claim that even though intangible
capital does not necessarily change results from other previous studies in which it has
not been taken into account, intangible capital may be able to explain the nature of the
structural change. Investments in intangible capital show particularly as improvements
in production processes inside of firms, which is captured by the within component. The
effect may also partly show in the between component after the financial crisis broke out
in 2008, as technology firm Nokia started to lose its market leading position and a large
number of ICT-engineers were employed into other similar companies and industries.
(Piekkola & Åkerholm 2013, 438.)
Similarly, Maliranta (2014a, 22) defines the amount of experts and executives in
a company as the indicator of the company’s level of innovation. According to Mali-
ranta (2014a, 22), the same definition is used in intangible capital studies and it seems
a relatively accurate indicator. Bearing in mind the aforementioned way of defining in-
novation, it looks like a major part of aggregate productivity growth in innovative firms
happens through creative destruction. This can be interpreted as labor input being redi-
rected among the firms with variation in productivity in a way that, in turn, enhances
productivity. However, the average productivity growth rate of innovative firms does
not greatly differ from that of less innovative firms. (Maliranta 2014a, 22.) Piekkola
& Åkerholm (2013, 438) also note that since the financial crisis, the Finnish economy
seems to become more and more divided into labor-intensive sectors that invest little
or not at all in intangible capital and therefore grow less (notably services) and into
manufacturing industries representing the top of the value chain. It can be deduced
that also looking at all manufacturing industries, the industries that are able to produce
high-quality products as opposed to raw materials and simple products are likely to in-
novate more and invest in intangible capital, which then generates more innovation and
increases industry productivity repeatedly.
Criscuolo et al. (2014) made a cross-country study on the dynamics of employment
growth, and found out that the age profile of firms became especially important when
studying small firms as net job creators. Entering firms appear to contribute the most to
job creation, and were followed by growing firms less than three years old. Nevertheless,
there was a clear drop in the contribution of both new entrants and young firms during
the Great Recession. (Criscuolo et al. 2014, 6.) During the latest recession, young
firms were also hit relatively harder by the downturn than larger firms. Regardless the
fact that young firms faced less creation and more destruction than before, they still
contributed positively to employment growth even during the crisis. (Criscuolo et al.
(2014), 11.) Even though firm age nor size is not directly in the focus of this study,
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these findings might shed light on the nature of the industries that have suffered from
economic downturns. For instance, industries with lots of young, entering firms can be
expected to have been hit hardest by both the 1990s depression as well as by the Great
Recession.
As was seen in Section 2.3, there are several factors that affect the creative destruc-
tion process on an institutional level. Criscuolo et al. (2014, 12) mention high entry
barriers, subsidies to continuing units and policies complicating the exit of the least
productive firms as factors that slow down resource reallocation and thus reduce com-
petition. This results in the productivity of new entrants being unnecessarily high while
the exiting units tend to exit laggardly with even lower productivity than with which
they should already exit the market. (Criscuolo et al. 2014, 12.) Criscuolo et al. (2014,
13) also point out that even though former theory and models may suggest that reces-
sions are followed by the creative destruction process that increases overall productivity
and therefore have a positive outcome, stringent financial market conditions may slow
down or even prevent structural change to such extent that productivity is also slowed
down on the long term. This might be a considerable issue especially in the case of
young, entering units that have found obtaining additional financing become a lot more
challenging than it was before the Great Recession as banks have tightened their credit
standards all around the globe.
60
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Changes in aggregate labor productivity
Figure 3: Aggregate labor productivity, manufacturing and the computer, electronic and
optical products industry
We have first modeled aggregate labor productivity growth for the entire manufac-
turing industry as well as for the electronic products industry (NACE 26) which is an
especially interesting industry in terms of its nature. In aggregate labor productivity,
changes in productivity in all periods of interest can be seen clearly. There are two ma-
jor periods where productivity falls significantly: in both 1989–1991 (starting in 1989
and steepening in 1990), corresponding the Finnish depression in the early 1990s, and in
2006–2009 (starting in 2006 and steepening in 2008), corresponding the latest recession
that is marked by the financial crisis that broke out on a global scale in 2008.
In addition, there is one significant fall in the electronic products industry in 2000–
2001, a fall that was already preceded by a first, smaller productivity decrease in 1997–
1999. This period corresponds to the so-called dot-com bubble, which blew out in the
start of the millennial when the markets realized that the huge growth of the IT compa-
nies that had been born at an amazing phase all around the world where overestimated in
value. Lastly, it can also be noticed that there is a small productivity slowdown around
years 1984 and 1985, which corresponds most likely to the changes in the banking and
capital market legislation. It is necessary to note that this slowdown is relatively small as
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compared to the previous ones mentioned and that there are actually several other slow-
downs in productivity which were relatively of the same size and have not been noted
here. However, the productivity slowdown in the mid-1980s is significant, because it
was clearly a precedent slowdown to the depression that occurred in the early 1990s,
which then became a major productivity shock in Finland. It is also worth pointing out
that the latest shocks corresponding the dot-com bubble and the recent financial crisis
have had an even more severe effect on the country’s productivity than the productivity
shock caused by the 1990s depression.
Except for the electronic products industry and the wood, paper and printing indus-
try (NACE 16–18), which suffers also from extremely volatile productivity, most other
manufacturing sectors have developed relatively similarly to the entire manufacturing
industry.
Figure 4: Cumulative aggregate labor productivity, manufacturing and the computer,
electronic and optical products industry
(1974 = 100)
Another useful tool is to look at cumulative aggregate labor productivity, as shown in
Figure 4. All years in the data have been modeled starting from the year 1980, in which
significant changes in productivity started to occur. The index value 100 corresponds
to year 1974. The figure shows that since 2008, the food products and beverages sector
(NACE 10–11) has actually been more productive in terms of aggregate labor produc-
tivity than the manufacturing industry overall. This change, however, is unlikely to be
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caused by creative destruction as the industry is not particularly R&D-intensive nor does
it experience lots of structural change as will be shown as follows, and it can therefore
be deducted that the productivity growth in the food products and beverages industry
is likely to be caused by growth within firms (as measured by the within component)
rather than by microstructural change (the between component). Aggregate labor pro-
ductivity of the electronic products industry (NACE 26) has also grown faster than the
manufacturing industry in general since the 1980s, except for the years 2000–2002 cor-
responding the dot-com bubble. The electronic products industry is a typical sector with
lots of R&D and in which creative destruction is expected to be an important source of
productivity growth. It can also be seen from the figure that productivity in the wood,
paper and printing industry (NACE 16–18) grew faster than the manufacturing industry
overall in 1993-2003, but its growth smoothed out in 2003 and has has been at a lower
level than the rest of the manufacturing industry since, though growing according to the
same pattern.
The textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products industry (NACE 13–15)
follows the manufacturing labor productivity as does the machinery and equipment in-
dustry (NACE 26–28) and the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of
machinery and equipment industry (NACE 31–33), which does though have a slightly
smaller growth rate during the period 1991–2009. The transport and equipment indus-
try (NACE 29–30) productivity growth also has the same form as the manufacturing
industry in general, but it has grown at a significantly lower level since 1988. For the
rubber and plastics products industry (NACE 22–23) the situation is the same, but only
since 1989 and for the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry (NACE 20–21)
since 1991. For reasons of simplicity, all of the sectors with a growth path similar to
the general manufacturing industry have been left out of the figure and the sectors re-
maining are the food products and beverages sector (NACE 10–11), the wood, paper
and printing industry (NACE 16–18), the electronic products industry (NACE 26) and
the entire manufacturing industry (NACE 10–33).
5.2 Structural change, market entry and exit and time interval
analysis
The between, entry and exit components for all representative sectors have been plotted
in Figures 5-14. The dotted red line shows the between component for the entire man-
ufacturing industry (including the industries in question), which works as a reference
when willing to compare the development of the between component to the develop-
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ment of the overall between component in manufacturing. Figure 5 shows all sectors
(10–33 according to the NACE classification).
In terms of the creative destruction process, or microstructural change, in the entire
manufacturing industry (see the between component in Figure 5), the creative destruc-
tion process seems to be augmenting since 1980. The overall augmentation from 1980
to 2011 has been approximately 29%. However, there are several years during which
the growth of the creative destruction process has slowed down: in 1993–1995, in 1997–
1998, in 2001–2002, and again in 2004 since which it stayed stable until the year 2008.
Since 2008, the creative destruction process is again on the rise.
Figure 5: Manufacturing Figure 6: Food products and beverages
In the food products and beverages industry (NACE 10–11, Figure 6), microstruc-
tural change as measured by the between component has been a lot less significant than
in other sectors of the manufacturing industry since 1984. However, the food products
and beverages industry has experienced a few clear periods in which its microstruc-
tural change has grown: first in 1992–1995 (experiencing approximately a 5% growth),
after which the growth was smoothed out, and now again in both 2002–2004 (approx-
imately 6 % growth) and 2007–2011 (approximately 4 % growth). The recent growth
since 2002 in the food products and beverages industry is consistent with the idea of the
reawakening of creative destruction as presented by Maliranta (2014a, 22–23).
The textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products industry (NACE 13–15,
Figure 7) is a typical labor-intensive industry with declining employment, which can
be expected to experience lots of creative destruction (Maliranta 2014a, 32). In the
textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products industry, creative destruction has
also been found to concentrate in companies with a low level of productivity (Maliranta
2014a, 32). The between component of the industry is almost identical to the between
component of manufacturing in general, with the distinction that the growth started
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Figure 7: Textiles, wearing apparel,
leather and related products
Figure 8: Wood and paper products,
and printing
slightly later (in the entire manufacturing industry, in the 1980s, and in the textile in-
dustry around 1987) and that the industry has therefore been growing at a lower level of
labor productivity. The difference between the textile industry between growth and the
manufacturing between growth has also been growing, ranging from 5% in 1987 to 9%
in 2011. In 2007, the textile industry experienced a steeper decline in structural change
than all sectors together (where between growth was merely smoothed out), though the
drop was only about 1% indicating that the sector might have recovered quickly or that
the shock was almost of the same extent as in other manufacturing sectors.
The wood and paper products, and printing industry (NACE 16–18, Figure 8) grew
in terms of microstructural change at a phase faster than that of manufacturing in general
until 1998. From 1979 to 1998, the sector experienced a 19% growth in the between
component. However, in 1999, the amount of microstructural change in the industry
fell below the general level of manufacturing and has been at a lower, fairly stable level
since. The year 1999 could be interpreted as the beginning of the dot-com bubble,
during which there was actually a decline in productivity also in other industries apart
from the dot-coms as can be seen in Figure 3. Between 1998 and 2011, the growth of
microstructural change has also fallen down slightly in the wood, paper and printing
industry (by about 2 %).
In the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry (NACE 20–21, Figure 9), the
between component has grown in the industry far less than in manufacturing in general
and even less than it has in the wood, paper and printing industry. While the between
component rose in manufacturing overall by around 29% in 1980–2011, the equivalent
rise in the chemicals and pharmaceutical products was of 8%. It seems like the chemi-
cal and pharmaceutical products industry has not experienced much creative destruction
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Figure 9: Chemical and
pharmaceutical products
Figure 10: Rubber and plastics products,
and other non-metallic mineral products
under the entire time period studied, and this supposition seems to be confirmed in Sec-
tion 5.2. As shown by the following Figure 10, the evolution of the between component
in the rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products (NACE
22–23) is similar to that of the manufacturing industries in general, but however with a
milder slope. Until the year 1990, it grew slightly faster than the between component
in manufacturing did in general. For around three years, it continued growing at the
same phase as the structural change for manufacturing in general, until the growth in
structural change started somewhat smoothing out around 1993.
Figure 11: Computer, electronic
and optical products
Figure 12: Machinery and equipment
As might be expected, the evolution of structural change in both the computer, elec-
tronic and optical products industry (NACE 26, Figure 11) as well as in machinery and
equipment (NACE 26–28, including the electronic products industry, Figure 12) is sim-
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ilar to each other. In the electronic products industry, the creative destruction process
seems a lot more volatile than in machinery and equipment and than in any other indus-
try, which is in line with the fact that the aggregate labor productivity of the electronic
products industry has also been a lot more volatile than that of the industry in general,
as can be seen in Figure 3. In the electronic products industry, the creative destruction
process appears to be growing at a faster phase than in the rest of the manufacturing
sectors since year 2002. In machinery and equipment, the same process actually started
earlier, growing faster than the rest of the manufacturing industries already since 1998.
Figure 13: Transport equipment Figure 14: Furniture, other manufacturing,
and repair and installation of machinery and
equipment
In both the transport equipment (NACE 29–30, Figure 13) and the furniture, other
manufacturing and repair and installation of machinery and equipment industry (NACE
31–33, Figure 14), the creative destruction process has been most similar to the one in
manufacturing in general. As what goes to the transport equipment industry, it could
even be said that the industry has grown in terms of structural change almost exactly as
manufacturing in general, except for years 2000–2008, during which it has experienced
somewhat less creative destruction than the other manufacturing industries. Since 2008,
the structural change is clearly on the rise in the transport equipment industry as it seems
to be growing again at the same phase as manufacturing in general.
In the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equip-
ment industry, the microstructural change slowed down in year 2002 (again correspond-
ing with the mentioned turning point but now with a totally different result) and has
been staying on its same stable level from 2002 till 2011 except for a fall in 2007 corre-
sponding the recent financial crisis and the changes it lead to in all of the components of
labor productivity. While the transport equipment industry seemed to be experiencing
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creative destruction very recently, the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and instal-
lation of machinery and equipment industry appears to follow the same progression as
do the wood and paper products, and printing and the rubber and plastics products, and
other non-metallic mineral products industries with little creative destruction.
To complete the analysis, the entry and exit components and their evolution in time
for the chosen representative sectors can also be examined bearing in mind that these
components are more sensitive to measurement errors and harder to distinguish as was
explained earlier in the study. As was stated in Section 2.2, the entry component tends
to be typically negative as new firms enter the market with a lower initial level of pro-
ductivity and once their productivity grows they are already middle-aged companies and
their effect is captured into the between component. Likewise, the exit component tends
to be typically positive since the firms leaving the market are often the least productive
ones, therefore augmenting the industry productivity by shutting down. The end of the
firm life cycle is also a longer process than what is captured into the exit component, and
for this reason, the exit component also exerts a positive effect on industry productivity
through the between component as the less productive firms first start by losing market
share to the more productive ones. First considering the entire manufacturing industry
as shown in Figure 5, the entry is a steadily descending slope, with its descent acceler-
ating visibly around the year 1999, then smoothing out a little in years 2005–2007 and
turning back to its accelerated descent since 2007.
In terms of sectors, the one single sector that does not follow the general pattern at
all is the electronic products industry (NACE26, Figure 11), that has an ascending entry
slope, unlike all other manufacturing industries. It can also be noted that the ascent of
the entry component steepens radically around 1997, and since the entry component is
constantly on the rise, it can be deduced that a lot of young, productive firms enter the
market, especially in the years preceding the dot-com bubble as well as in the recent
years.
Examining the entry component, several other industries can also be noted as not ex-
actly following the general evolution of the entry component in manufacturing. These
are the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry (NACE 20–21) and the transport
equipment (NACE 29–30). In chemical and pharmaceutical products, the entry compo-
nent is slightly upward sloping from 1979 to 1986, until it falls in 1987 and then again
ascends in 1987–1992, being descending like the other sectors since 1992. The trans-
port equipment industry also has an ascending entry component throughout 1977–1994
(except for 1984 and 1990, during which it falls), after which it is descending until year
2009, from which it then seems to be ascending again.
Looking again at the manufacturing industry in general in Figure 5, the exit compo-
nent is a steadily ascending slope, its ascent accelerating slightly around year 1986, then
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increasing and decreasing back to its prior level in years 1994–1999 and finally increas-
ing again since 2008. The form of the entry and exit components correspond each other,
and they seem to even out each other approximately like they are expected to. As in
the entry component case, the electronic products industry is the single industry clearly
deviating from the evolution of the exit component in the manufacturing in general from
1987 to 2002. In 2002 though, the turning point again, the exit component turns positive
and starts ascending and ascends until 2011 (except for the year 2008).
The chemical and pharmaceutical products industry is equally interesting consider-
ing the exit component, as its exit component grew more or less following the manu-
facturing industry until 1995, and from then on has been fairly stable except for a short
period 2005–2009 when it ascended again. Regarding the exit component, the textiles,
wearing apparel, leather and related products industry (NACE 13–15) is also interesting
as its exit component grew significantly between 1986–1990, therefore allowing the in-
dustry to ascend at a higher level than the rest of the manufacturing industry did, except
for 2008. The transport equipment industry (NACE 29–30) is equally interesting as its
exit component experienced a significant increase in 1983, which shows in Figure 13 as
a sharp rise in that particular year. This increase was smoothed out afterward and has
then made the industry ascend somewhat slower than the industry overall.
Tables 3-12 show the aggregate labor productivity change for capital and sectors
(chemical and pharmaceutical products, computer, electronic and optical products, ma-
chinery and equipment and transport equipment), for capital but not R&D-intensive
sectors (food products and beverages, wood and paper products, and printing and rub-
ber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products) as well as labor-
intensive sectors (textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products and furniture;
other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment) and the over-
all manufacturing industry (NACE 10–33). The tables show all components of labor
productivity at specific intervals, and are in the form of annual percentage (%) growth
(remembering that the underlying values are actually logarithmic percents that approxi-
mately equal percents and can, therefore, be interpreted as such).
The results have been computed for six different time periods, four of them which
correspond a productivity shock and two of them serving as reference periods for time
periods not known to have been affected by economic downturns. The first period 1980–
1988 corresponds the period during which the capital markets were liberalized in Fin-
land and the country opened up to economic trade, followed by the Finnish depression
in the early 1990s (period 1989–1992), then by the dot-com bubble around the turn of
the millennial (1997–2002) and finally the recent great depression (2008–2011). The
reference periods are 1993-1996 and 2002–2007.
Looking at the entire manufacturing industry (displayed in Table 3), it seems rather
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Table 3: Manufacturing industry
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.58 9.61 0.49  0.33 0.82 0.49
1989–1992 7.03 4.47 1.45  0.29 1.39 1.10
1993–1996 5.70 2.61 1.49  0.52 2.12 1.60
1997–2002 3.44 2.46 1.05  1.13 1.06  0.07
2002–2007 3.37 2.56 0.29  1.23 1.75 0.52
2008–2011 0.00  2.54 1.07  1.28 2.75 1.47
average 5.02 3.19 0.97  0.80 1.65 0.85
clear that the aggregate productivity has slowed down gradually since 1980. In litera-
ture, this is called the productivity slowdown and it affects Finland just like it affects
numerous other Western countries. In the 1980s it grew by an annual rate around 10 %
while in the period 2008–2011 the annual aggregate productivity growth had dropped
down to 0% per year due to the productivity shock triggered by the financial crisis that
turned productivity growth negative, as can be seen from Figure 3. In the period 2008–
2011, the change turned out to be strongly negative in the within component, while it
stayed positive for both the net entry effect (the positive exit effect being larger in size
than the negative entry effect, net entry being measured as the entry component plus the
exit component) and the between component.
Table 4: Chemical and pharmaceutical products
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.19 9.05 0.40  0.15 0.90 0.75
1989–1992 6.35 4.93 0.15 0.84 0.43 1.27
1993–1996 2.60 1.44 0.67  0.36 0.85 0.49
1997–2002 3.00 3.23  0.10  0.09  0.04  0.13
2002–2007 3.22 3.65 0.21  0.24  0.41  0.65
2008–2011 2.97 2.44 0.12  0.61 1.02 0.41
average 4.72 4.12 0.24  0.10 0.46 0.36
The Table 4 shows the detailed decomposition results for the chemical and pharma-
ceutical products industry. Conforming to results in the previous sections, the chemical
and pharmaceutical products industry has been experiencing lower aggregate labor pro-
ductivity than manufacturing in all periods, except in 2008–2011, also according to the
time interval analysis. The between component is a lot less significant for the chemical
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and pharmaceutical products industry than it is for manufacturing overall. In the case of
period 2008–2011, in which the industry seems to be quite surprisingly growing more
on the aggregate than manufacturing in general, the difference is accounted for by the
within component, while both the between component and the net entry effect seem
insignificant. Coming to period 2008–2011, the relative importance of the exit grows,
still leaving the net entry effect of minor importance in all the periods studied.
Table 5: Computer, electronic and optical products
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.17 8.62 0.76 0.82  0.03 0.79
1989–1992 7.54 8.44 1.22 0.82  2.94  2.12
1993–1996 5.30 2.76 1.46 0.65 0.42 1.07
1997–2002 0.94  0.63 1.23 2.49  2.15 0.35
2002–2007 5.17 0.31 1.66 0.15 3.04 3.19
2008–2011  2.46  6.42 1.80  0.99 3.15 2.16
average 4.44 2.18 1.36 0.65 0.25 0.91
As noted in Section 5.1, the electronic, computer and optical products industry
(NACE 26) has been growing faster than the manufacturing industry in general in
terms of cumulative growth already since 1980, except for the years 2002–2003, and
in terms of actual aggregate labor productivity growth since the year 2002. It can also
be seen from Figure 3 that the aggregate productivity growth dropped first moderately
in 1997–1999 and then even more in 2000–2001, and thus these are the years that are
also expected to come up in the time interval decomposition results. It was also noted
previously that the between component has been a lot more volatile for the electronic
products industry than it is for the machinery and equipment sector, for instance. Now
studying Table 5, it can be seen that in the electronic products industry, the entry com-
ponent is positive for all time periods except in 2008–2011. The net entry effect has
been larger in the electronic products industry than in manufacturing in general over the
years 1980–1988 and 1997–2011. The volatility of the industry is also reflected in its
aggregate labor productivity: the aggregate labor productivity has been clearly smaller
in periods 1997–2002 and 2008–2011, and, on the other hand, clearly larger than for
manufacturing in general between 2002 and 2007, which is also generally considered a
period of higher growth between economic shocks. The structural change appears also
to contribute more into the electronic products industry than it does into manufacturing
in general, especially in the three periods covering the years 1997–2011.
As was also noted previously in Section 5.1, the between component has been grow-
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Table 6: Machinery and equipment
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 9.62 8.80 0.66  0.04 0.20 0.16
1989–1992 7.31 5.85 1.36  0.08 0.19 0.10
1993–1996 7.82 4.62 2.11  0.24 1.33 1.09
1997–2002 2.63 1.00 1.71  0.72 0.63  0.09
2002–2007 4.25 2.69 1.17  1.30 1.69 0.39
2008–2011 0.77  2.18 1.94  1.07 2.09 1.01
average 5.40 3.46 1.49  0.58 1.02 0.44
ing faster than in the manufacturing industries in general since the year 1998 also in
machinery and equipment, and similarly to the electronic products industry. Comparing
next machinery and equipment (NACE 26–28) as presented in Table 6 to manufactur-
ing in general (Table 3), aggregate labor productivity growth seems a lot more similar to
manufacturing and less volatile than the electronic products industry. In both 2002–2007
(as for the electronic products industry) and in 2008–2011 the aggregate labor produc-
tivity growth per year was larger than that of manufacturing in general. In machinery
and equipment, all of the entry components are negative instead of positive as for the
electronic products industry, which suggests that the entry component could potentially
be even more negative without the bias created by adding such a particular industry as
the electronic products industry in. Net entry seems to have a little less significant effect
than for manufacturing in general and the between component seems to have a similar
effect as for the electronic products industry, as structural change contributes more to
machinery and equipment than it does to manufacturing in general from 1993–2011.
All evidence seems to indicate that similar changes in the electronic products industry
show also in the machinery and equipment industry, often occurring a few years prior
to the electronic products industry. It is also important to note that on the aggregate, the
machinery and equipment sector was significantly less affected by the Great Recession
in period 2008–2011 than the electronic products industry.
Considering the transportation equipment industry (NACE 29–30), it was com-
mented in Section 5.2 that the sector seems to exhibit less creative destruction than other
industries during 2000–2008, and otherwise similar effects to manufacturing overall.
Transport equipment was also noticed to have a lower level of aggregate labor produc-
tivity since 1988. In 1980–1988 and 2002–2007, the between component was more
significant than in manufacturing, but during the other years studied it was fairly similar
to that of the entire manufacturing industry. From 1980 to 1996 the aggregate labor
productivity growth was smaller than in manufacturing in general, and on the contrary
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Table 7: Transport equipment
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 9.69 7.64 0.64 0.01 1.40 1.41
1989–1992 3.69 1.12 1.24 0.34 0.99 1.33
1993–1996 3.38 1.46 1.27  0.36 1.02 0.65
1997–2002 4.04 3.27 0.79  0.38 0.36  0.02
2002–2007 3.52 2.84 0.64  0.50 0.54 0.04
2008–2011 2.21 0.37 0.86 0.28 0.70 0.97
average 4.42 2.78 0.91  0.10 0.83 0.73
from 1997 to 2011 the aggregate labor productivity has been greater than in manufac-
turing in general. Until 2007 the growth seems almost merely accountable to within
industry growth, but in the last period 2008–2011, this seems to have changed as both
the net entry effect as well as the between component account for the most part of pro-
ductivity growth while the within component only contributes about a half of what the
aforementioned components do.
Table 8: Food products and beverages
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.07 10.46  0.30  0.34 0.24  0.10
1989–1992 6.23 5.25 0.13  0.46 1.32 0.86
1993–1996 2.96 0.27 0.78  0.39 2.30 1.91
1997–2002 3.00 2.83  0.13  0.43 0.73 0.30
2002–2007 3.77 2.89 0.66  1.01 1.22 0.21
2008–2011 5.79 2.79 0.84  1.23 3.39 2.16
average 5.30 4.08 0.33  0.64 1.53 0.89
The food products and beverages sector (NACE 10–11) was noted in the previous
chapter to have been more productive than manufacturing in general (NACE 10–33)
on the aggregate since year 2008. This can be seen by comparing Table 8 to Table 3:
the aggregate annual productivity growth for both periods 2002–2007 and 2008–2011
is larger for the food products industry than for manufacturing, and the difference is
notable especially for the latter period during which manufacturing in general did not
experience any productivity growth and food products grew by 5.79 percent (%). As
was suspected, the difference lies in the within component that turned negative for man-
ufacturing but remained positive for the food products industry, whereas the between
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component has been less significant in the food products industry than in manufacturing
in general. The between component has even been negative for the food products in-
dustry in 1980–1988 and in 1997–2002. In addition, in 2008–2011 the net entry effect
was larger in the food products and beverages than in the overall manufacturing indus-
try. Section 5.3 showed that the food products and beverages industry is particular in its
dependence on consumption rather than export demand, and should, therefore, be rather
classified as an industry dependent on domestic demand and than as a capital-intensive
industry.
Table 9: Wood and paper products, and printing
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.93 9.62 0.63  0.44 1.12 0.69
1989–1992 5.57 3.18 1.62  0.55 1.31 0.76
1993–1996 7.59 4.61 0.88  0.60 2.70 2.10
1997–2002 3.84 3.53 0.20  1.40 1.51 0.11
2002-2007 1.03 0.96  0.46  0.82 1.36 0.53
2008–2011  3.01  5.65 0.05  0.99 3.58 2.59
average 4.32 2.71 0.49  0.80 1.93 1.13
It was also noticed that the wood and paper products, and printing industry (NACE
16–18) had grown faster than the overall manufacturing industry until the year 1998 in
terms of actual growth (see Section 5.2), and from 1993–2003 in terms of cumulative
growth (see Section 5.1). Looking at Table 9, it can be seen that on the aggregate, the
wood and paper industry actually grew faster in three periods: 1980–1988, 1993–1996
and in 1997–2002. It was also noted that since 2003, the productivity growth had been
at a clearly lower level. This is definitely true for the period 2002–2007 (compare Tables
9 and 3) and even more than clear from the following period 2008–2011, in which the
aggregate labor productivity growth had turned clearly negative (-3,01% for the wood
and paper industry) while it only became neutral (0%) in manufacturing in general. This
negative change in aggregate labor productivity in 2008–2011 was principally due to an
extremely negative within component which was somewhat relieved by the positive exit
(net entry) effect, while the between component had almost no contribution at all. The
between component was actually less significant for the wood and paper industry than in
manufacturing in general in all periods except for years 1980–1992 (being particularly
negative in 2002–2007), which seems to reflect the fact that the industry was exposed to
the structural change already before the mid-1980s as mentioned previously.
In the rubber and plastics products sector (NACE 22–23), the aggregate productivity
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Table 10: Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.21 9.63 0.30  0.25 0.52 0.27
1989–1992 3.32 1.81 1.20  0.31 0.62 0.31
1993–1996 7.26 5.39 0.76  0.69 1.80 1.11
1997–2002 2.56 2.41 0.11  0.48 0.52 0.04
2002–2007 5.41 4.00 0.16  0.46 1.70 1.25
2008–2011 0.19  1.04 0.66  0.46 1.02 0.57
average 4.82 3.70 0.53  0.44 1.03 0.59
growth seemed to follow the same pattern as that of the overall manufacturing industry
with the exception that it had grown at a clearly lower level since 1989 (as noted in Sec-
tion 5.1). In Section 5.2, it was also noted that until the 1990s, the industry productivity
grew faster than manufacturing in general, and that the aggregate labor productivity fell
simultaneously while the growth in the between component was smoothed out around
the year 1993. The fall in 1993 is suspected to might have been a consequence of the
early 1990s depression. Interestingly enough, when looking at the time periods given
(see Table 10), the rubber and plastics products, and other non–metallic mineral prod-
ucts industry seems to have experienced more aggregate labor productivity growth in
both 1993–1996 and 2002–2007, and even slightly more in 2008–2011 as compared to
manufacturing overall (Table 3). This seems to be simply caused by differences in the
size of the within component (which was more positive in 1993–1996 and 2002–2007
as well as less negative in 2008–2011) as well as in 2002–2007 due to a more positive
exit (net entry) effect. Moreover, the between component is less significant in the rubber
and plastics industry throughout the years than it is in manufacturing in general.
Table 11: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 8.37 7.34 0.23  0.32 1.13 0.80
1989–1992 8.86 4.98 1.04 0.03 2.82 2.84
1993–1996 5.98 3.56 1.11  0.35 1.66 1.31
1997–2002 4.02 2.39 0.75  1.29 2.17 0.88
2002–2007 4.56 2.38 0.94  0.95 2.18 1.23
2008–2011 0.72 0.32 0.32  1.41 1.49 0.08
average 5.42 3.49 0.73  0.72 1.91 1.19
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Finally, looking at the sectors first classified as labor-intensive, one can start by
reviewing Figure 11 corresponding the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related
products industry (NACE 13–15). In Section 5.1, it was noted that the textile industry
follows a relatively similar pattern as manufacturing does overall, and in Section 5.2 it
was noted that the between component was also similar to that of the manufacturing in-
dustry except that structural change started to grow slightly later in 1987 and has grown
at a lower level since. Now proceeding to Table 11, it can bee seen that since 1989,
the textile industry seems to experience faster productivity growth on the aggregate that
manufacturing does in general. This is accounted for mainly by the within compo-
nent, while the between component has a similar effect than it in manufacturing does in
general except for 2002–2007 during which it has a greater impact on the productivity
growth as in other industries. The net entry effect seems to contribute more than it typ-
ically does in years 1980–1992 and 1997–2007 (as compared to Table 3), but however
is less significant in 2008–2011. The similarities in the evolution of the textile indus-
try and the food products and beverages industry seem self-explanatory and therefore
it is also preferred to classify the textile industry rather as dependent on consumption
demand than labor-intensive.
Table 12: Furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and
equipment
aggregate within between entry exit net entry
1980–1988 10.17 8.93 0.36  0.26 1.14 0.88
1989–1992 5.27 2.92 1.55  0.44 1.24 0.80
1993–1996 6.79 3.41 1.43  0.24 2.19 1.96
1997–2002 2.84 2.30 1.03  1.52 1.03  0.49
2002–2007 4.46 3.77 0.25  1.41 1.85 0.44
2008–2011 2.17 0.53  0.25  0.88 2.75 1.88
average 5.28 3.64 0.73  0.79 1.70 0.91
It was previously noted in Section 5.1 that the furniture, other manufacturing; re-
pair and installation of machinery and equipment industry (NACE 31–33, Figure 12)
seemed to grow less rapidly than manufacturing in general from 1991 to 2009 in terms
of cumulative aggregate labor productivity. In addition, in Section 5.2, it was found
out that in 2002 the structural growth slowed down instead of having accelerated, then
fell in 2007 and has otherwise followed a fairly stable level in 2002–2007. Looking at
Table 12, it actually seems like the aggregate annual growth has been growing faster in
the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment
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and other manufacturing industry than in manufacturing during years 1993–1996 and
2002–2011. In the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machin-
ery and equipment industry, the between component seems to contribute approximately
as much as in manufacturing in general, except for 2008–2011 during which between
actually turns negative and during which the changes are mainly accounted for by the
positive net entry and especially the positive exit component as well as partially by the
positive within growth respective to manufacturing in general.
Both the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related productsindustry as well as
the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment
industry seem to imitate the aggregate labor productivity growth of manufacturing (Ta-
ble 3). However, the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machin-
ery and equipment industry was found more dependent on exports than on domestic
demand, and has also some temporal particularities which means it should be rather
classified as an export-dependent industry. Even though somewhat similar to the textile
industry, the classification into consumption and export demand is preferred instead of
considering the aforementioned industries labor-intensive.
5.3 Export demand and consumption demand
In the study, it was also considered a possibility that export demand could explain pro-
ductivity in the some of the representative sectors studied whereas consumption (do-
mestic demand) would explain the productivity of others. Export demand measured
as total exports of goods for Finland (scale on the right) is shown together with the
cumulative aggregate labor productivity of five sectors known to depend heavily on ex-
ports (scale on left) in Figure 15. The data is from the statistics of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2016a) and has been retrieved from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis site under the title Total Exports of Goods for
Finland. As can be seen from the the figure, many industrial sectors are clearly depen-
dent on the evolution of exports. When exports abroad grow (decline), productivity in
export-dependent sectors is likely to grow (decline) respectively. To investigate which
industries were dependent on exports, a linear regression was constructed for each rep-
resentative sector at a time in order to explain both aggregate labor productivity and
between component growth by growth in exports (measured in logarithmic percents like
earlier). Results of the regression analysis together with corresponding figures are found
in Appendix I. The analysis shows that aggregate labor productivity seems to be depen-
dent on exports in the textiles, wood and paper, chemical and pharmaceutical products,
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Figure 15: Cumulative aggregate labor productivity in several sectors and exports
rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products, computer and
electronic products, machinery and equipment, transport equipment, in furniture, other
manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment industries and in
manufacturing overall. Exports seem to be non-significant only in the food products
and beverages industry, which also has a different shape cumulative aggregate produc-
tivity curve than the other industries as can be seen already in Figure 4. Therefore,
explaining the aggregate labor productivity growth in the food products and beverages
industry by exports did not produce reliable results enabling to make any predictions on
the regression analysis.
In terms of structural change (measured by the between component), regression
analysis showed that structural change could not be explained by growth in exports
even though aggregate labor productivity growth was. Only the between component of
transport equipment and of overall manufacturing explained by exports reached a sig-
nificant confidence level p 6 0.05 but even those regressions did not seem particularly
accurate as measured by R2 or adjusted R2. The results suggest that structural change
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between production units is very unlikely to depend on exports even in the industries
driven by export growth, whereas aggregate labor productivity seems to correlate most
clearly with exports.
Figure 16 shows the evolution of private consumption (scale on the right) as com-
pared to three sectors (scale on the left) of which food products and beverages seems
lately to be the sector most driven by consumption demand. The data is from the statis-
tics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2016b)
and has been retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis site under the ti-
tle Private Final Consumption Expenditure in Finland. The textiles, wearing apparel,
leather and related products industry and machinery and equipment serve as a refer-
ence showing the general growth of cumulative aggregate labor productivity growth in
other industries, all of which seem to have evolved similarly to domestic consumption
throughout the years. In terms of this study, the most significant part of the figure lies
in years 2009–2011, in which productivity and exports dropped but both private con-
sumption and aggregate productivity in the food products and beverages industry are
on the rise. Therefore, the food products and beverages industry can be nominated as
the industry that is clearly the most dependent on private consumption in Finland and
is significantly more dependent on domestic demand rather than on exports. Though
not shown in the figure, it was also noticed that the chemical and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts industry and the transport equipment industry were the sectors that were found the
least dependent on consumption demand while manufacturing overall seems to follow
consumption demand until 2007 since which it has been diverging more from the con-
sumption demand and rather following export demand. The textile industry was also
found relatively dependent on domestic demand as was, quite interestingly, machinery
and equipment. Nevertheless, the two industries suffer from a productivity shock at the
time of the Great Recession in 2007 during which consumption demand seems to carry
on unaffected. Unlike what was expected in Section 4.3, the furniture, other manufac-
turing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment industry showed not to be
dependent on consumption demand.
5.4 Overview of the sectoral results
The food products and beverages industry was seen to experience a reawakening of cre-
ative destruction around 2002. The fact that the growth of the between component in
the sector is less significant than in the manufacturing industry in general corresponds
the idea that productivity in the food products and beverage industry has grown rather
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Figure 16: Cumulative aggregate labor productivity in several sectors and private con-
sumption
thanks to growth within production units than thanks to creative destruction as was
supposed in Section 5.1. However, it seems that in the periods following productiv-
ity shocks there has been some structural change though, which could indicate that the
productivity shocks have obliged the food products and beverages industry also to re-
structure and innovate. In Section 5.2, it was noted that the food products industry had
larger aggregate labor productivity growth than manufacturing in general from 2002 to
2011, especially during the Great Recession in 2008–2011 during which aggregate la-
bor productivity grew significantly in the food product industry while it turned negative
in manufacturing. The growth was largely accounted for through the within component,
but looking at Table 8, the significance of the between component can also be seen to
have relatively increased.
Most interestingly, the net entry effect grew remarkably in the food products in-
dustry in period 2008–2011, which could at least partially indicate creative destruction
though not yet reflected by the between component. The evidence seems to support the
idea that food products and beverages industry has lately experienced an increase in its
productivity growth mainly due to firms optimizing their production processes and in-
creasing productivity from within and, since the Great Recession, due to an increasingly
positive exit (net entry) effect. As was suspected earlier, the evidence seems equally to
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support the idea that the Great Recession has obliged the food products industry to inno-
vate, but not necessarily to restructure as much: by looking at specific years in Section
5.2, microstructural change was found to have grown in 1992–1995, 2002–2004 and in
2007–2011, but the structural change seems less significant when looking at the time
interval analysis in Section 5.2. The productivity growth in the food products and bev-
erages industry is therefore likely originating principally from other factors than the
creative destruction process, except for the latest years after the Great Recession.
Next proceeding to analyze the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related prod-
ucts sector, it can be deduced that the textile industry does experience creative destruc-
tion, though there is no such clear change in it around 2002 as there is for many other
industries. However, when looking at specific time intervals in Section 5.2, it seems that
the influence of the between component grew in the industry in the period 2002–2007.
The creative destruction process in the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related
products industry appears to be slightly less significant than that in manufacturing in
general, which could suggest that the creative destruction process is even stronger in
R&D-intensive industries than it is in labor-intensive industries. Moreover, it could also
suggest that the creative destruction process is stronger in export-dependent industries
as compared to domestic consumption dependent industries, bearing in mind that the
textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products industry was found to be at least
somewhat dependent on consumption previously. Section 5.2 also revealed that for the
last 12 years studied, the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related productsindustry
has experienced faster aggregate labor productivity growth than manufacturing in gen-
eral when measured as annual average growth and that the within component was found
to be a significant underlying factor behind the aggregate productivity growth. Net en-
try also seemed more significant than typically in manufacturing in most of the years
studied, but not in 2008–2011.
The finding that creative destruction was stronger in the wood, paper and printing
industry until 1998 is consistent with prior research, in which the paper industry has
been found to have experienced significant creative destruction already prior to 1985.
This might have been due to market pressure from the Western markets already before in
the mid-1980s (Maliranta 2014b, 33). In Section 5.2, it was also noted that the between
component contributed more to the wood, paper and printing industry than to manu-
facturing in general in the two first periods 1980–1988 and 1989–1992. This is in line
with the supposition that structural change was strong in the wood, paper and printing
industry before than in many other industries and already in the mid-1980s, but it seems
like structural change has become less significant since the early 1990s depression. One
possible explanation for why the aggregate productivity growth has been much less sig-
nificant at least since 2002 in the wood and paper products industry as opposed to other
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manufacturing industries lies in the lack of creative destruction which has endured for
years.
The wood, paper and printing industry was particularly hit by the Great Recession
in interval 2008–2011, which was principally caused by an extremely negative within
component. Interestingly and somewhat similarly to what was noted in the case of the
food products and beverages industry, the net entry effect lead by a very positive exit
effect actually smoothed out the negative within effect to a certain extent as can be seen
from Table 9. Maliranta (2014a, 32) considers that the wood and paper industry could
even be experiencing negative creative destruction. The between component has had
almost no contribution to the evolution of the industry in the last 15 years, indicating
that there has been little structural change in the industry since the 1980s during which
structural change boosted the sector. It is prudent to conclude that the wood and paper
industry has not been experiencing sufficient reallocation of resources from less pro-
ductive units to more productive ones since the 1990s, and this has likely affected its
overall productivity growth as well. Technological advances and innovations have been
less present in the wood and paper industry as compared to many other manufacturing
sectors, which might be one explanation for why the wood and paper industry is one of
the sectors that has least profited from creative destruction.
If one should distinguish a single industry with least creative destruction as mea-
sured by the between component, this would definitely be the chemical and pharma-
ceutical products industry. It was noted that the structural change in manufacturing, in
general, was around 3,5 times stronger than in the chemical and pharmaceutical products
industry (29% vs. 8%). Considering overall productivity growth, this can be interpreted
very little or almost no development in the between component in around 30 years time,
which would lead to think that there has been very little creative destruction in the indus-
try. This is quite surprising, as one could suppose that the chemical and pharmaceutical
products sector invests a lot in R&D and is constantly innovating. The difference could
be partly accounted to the fact that the entry, exit and between components in the in-
dustry seem much more volatile than those of other industries. Nevertheless, it seems
that microstructural change has remained at a fairly stable level in the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2011, while the microstructural change has
augmented rapidly in manufacturing overall.
The chemical and pharmaceutical products industry was also found interesting in
terms of the entry and exit components: it was noted in Section 5.2 that the entry com-
ponent of the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry was slightly ascending
from 1979 to 1992, since which it has been descending like for other manufacturing in-
dustries. The ascent could tell about many young, productive firms entering the market
in a similar way as for the electronic products industry, but however, this development
82
only continued until the end of the depression in 1992. In the case of entering units in
the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry, this might have meant that after the
depression, the entering production units were less productive than the established units
in the market in general as had been true in other industries already prior to the depres-
sion. The exit component in the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry reflects
a slightly different evolution as mentioned in Section 5.2, as it diverges from the norm
in the manufacturing industries starting in the year 1995, from which it stayed relatively
stable for around ten years: this could reflect a long, stagnant phase preceding the finan-
cial crisis that broke out around 2008 in which the chemical and pharmaceutical industry
did relatively well and the least productive units were actually not necessarily obliged to
exit the market as they were able to make profits regardless of being less productive and
thanks to the favorable market environment. In Schumpeterian growth theory, this is the
so-called Schumpeterian effect presented in Section 3.4, in which competition works as
a discouraging factor to stagnated companies that do not seek to become market leaders
and only reach for short-term results.
In Section 5.1, it was noted that in terms of cumulative aggregate labor productivity,
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry has grown following the same pattern than
manufacturing in general with the exception that the growth has been at a significantly
lower level since 1991. This was even lower than the corresponding level of wood,
paper products and printing industry. This combined with the change in the entry com-
ponent around the same time leads to consider that the early 1990s depression affected
the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry most clearly. Since the entry, exit
and between components were found very volatile, it was expected that analyzing an-
nual averages would help correct the possible errors caused by volatility. Measured
by an annual growth rate, the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry experi-
enced lower aggregate labor productivity than manufacturing in all periods except for
2008–2011 as seen in Section 5.2. This divergence is due to differences in the within
component (not in the between or the net entry component) and therefore also unrelated
to creative destruction. It could also lead suggest that the Great Recession affected the
chemical and pharmaceutical products industry less than the early 1990s depression. In
addition, it was noted that relative to the industry level in general, the significance of the
exit component has grown towards years 2008–2011.
In the rubber and plastics product industry, the slowdown in structural change since
1993 noted in Section 5.2, regardless of more important structural change than in man-
ufacturing in general before 1990, could be reflecting a more general slowdown in all
components of productivity with a couple years lag after the depression in Finland, as
aggregate labor productivity in the sector dropped down after 1993 as well. It seems
also relatively clear that the rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic min-
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eral products industry is a capital but not R&D-intensive industry much like the wood
and paper products industry and also similarly dependent on export, and might therefore
have evolved in a similar manner, experiencing only minor creative destruction in the
last decade(s). However, as was noted in Section 5.2, in 1993–1996 and in 2002–2011
the aggregate labor productivity of the rubber and plastics industry was actually higher
than that of manufacturing overall, though only slightly for the period corresponding the
Great Recession 2008–2011. The differences were mainly accounted for by the within
component, and for the period 2002–2007 by a more positive net entry, in particular
exit, effect. The between component was also noted to be less significant in the industry
than in manufacturing in general. The increase in net entry could tell about the reawak-
ening of creative destruction to some extent, and even more so about the speeding up of
the ’destruction side’ effect after the productivity shock that occurred in the turn of the
millennial. During the early 2000s productivity shock, especially the exit component
appears to have grown more rapidly than other components and thus has an increasingly
positive effect.
Proceeding to the machinery and equipment and electronic products industries, the
finding that creative destruction started growing faster in machinery and equipment al-
ready in 1998 and later on in 2002 in the electronic products industry corresponds the
idea that the dot-com bubble happened simultaneously with a more general productivity
shock and that changes in the companies in the ICT-sector (such as those working in
the electronic products industry) were actually preceded by the acceleration of creative
destruction in other significant industries, such as in machinery and equipment. This is
consistent with prior research that claims that the ’wave of creative destruction’ in the
early 2000s was actually not lead by the ICT-cluster, and that the process was actually
similar in many manufacturing sectors (Maliranta 2014b, 32). Machinery (NACE 28)
has also been studied as a separate sector and it seems to be one of the most significant
sectors in manufacturing with creative destruction very similar to that of the entire man-
ufacturing industry, and independent from the computer, electronic and optical products
industry (NACE 26) (Maliranta 2014b, 32).
Regarding the electronic products industry, it can be considered that the rise in pro-
ductivity starting in 2002 was creative destruction originating from the dot-com bubble
that served as a trigger to allocate resources in a new way to more productive firms.
These findings are also in line with those of Maliranta (2014a, 32), who found that
creative destruction was relatively strong in industries producing machinery and equip-
ment and that sectors with lots of R&D activities, such as the high tech industries, tend
to experience lots of creative destruction. Besides, it was noted in Section 5.2 that
the entry and exit components of the electronic products industry differed significantly
from those of any other industry. Since the entry component is generally negative due to
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young firms entering the market with productivity lower than in the industry on average,
the electronic products industry can be considered as particular in the sense that many
firms in the industry come into the market with a new innovation, and thanks to that
innovation, also with a higher level of productivity than what companies in the mar-
ket currently have as they do not possess the new technology. In other words, young
computer, electronic and optical products firms enter the market with a particularly high
level of productivity thanks to the impressive amount of intangible capital in the sector.
Investments, especially in the IT sector and software industry, are characterized by
their capital efficiency for both experimentation and for subsequent scaling as well as
for their ability to generate large returns relatively fast (Kerr et al. 2014, 33). This means
that it is easier for venture capital firms and investors to run lots of initial experiments at
a controlled cost and then find out the ’fittest’ in order to fund them on a second round
(Kerr et al. 2014, 33). This is another likely reason for the computer, electronic and
optical products industry to exhibit such a positive entry effect: since new firms receive
funding with relative ease, there are many new technologies and ideas that compete for
funding in the industry, of which the most productive ones are the ones that receive
funds and then enter the market. Regardless of numerous factors that have created a
positive entry effect in the past years, the time interval analysis conducted in Section 5.2
showed that the entry component turned out to be positive in all time intervals except
during years 2008–2011, reflecting the gravity of the Great Recession in the electronic
products industry.
Moreover, the evolution of the exit component in the electronic components industry
could tell about the overheating in the dot-com market: only since 2002, the less pro-
ductive firms have also been obliged to leave the market and are then replaced by new,
more productive production units. Before the millennial, there might have been so much
demand for the inventions of the dot-com companies that even the less productive ones
could actually stay in the market, therefore causing a negative exit effect. This definitely
supports the idea of the reawakening of creative destruction in 2002 and that the dot-
com bubble was followed by positive productivity effects through the exit component.
The exit component in the electronic products industry fell in 2008, corresponding the
effects of the Great Recession that may likely have been preceded by a stagnant period
and thus accelerated the exit of ineffective production units only since 2009. In Section
5.2, it was also observed that the aggregate labor productivity of the electronic products
industry was clearly smaller than in manufacturing in general over periods 1997–2002
and 2008–2011, reflecting the fact that the industry is extremely sensitive to economic
shocks and that, on the other hand, the industry seems to recover relatively rapidly. In
2002–2007, for instance, labor productivity grew faster in electronic products than in
other manufacturing industries on the aggregate. This might be thanks to the significant
85
contribution of creative destruction, which was clearly larger for the electronic products
industry than for the overall manufacturing industry in 1997–2011.
In Section 5.2, it was also mentioned that the Great Recession affected productiv-
ity to a lot larger extent in the electronic products industry than it did in machinery
and equipment, and this is also supported by the finding that machinery and equipment
had higher aggregate productivity in both 2002–2007 as well as 2008–2011 than other
manufacturing industries did in general. In addition, it was also noted that the struc-
tural change contributed to labor productivity in machinery and equipment from 1993
to 2011 on a larger scale than it did for manufacturing in general.
Like for manufacturing in general, it is seems that both the transport equipment and
the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment
industry that the industries are affected by structural change and that it is a relatively
important factor behind their labor productivity growth. In Section 5.2, it was noted that
from 2000 to 2008, the transport equipment was less affected by creative destruction and
has gone back to the normal evolution of manufacturing in general since 2008. During
the same period, the entry component descended and the exit component ascended sim-
ilarly to the manufacturing industry in general. This 8-year period in transport equip-
ment could reflect a period of higher economic growth during which productivity growth
happened rather within production units as no significant changes in the entry, exit nor
between components are found.
As noted in Section 5.2, the entry component in the transport equipment industry
behaved in a particular way in 1977–1983, 1985–1989 and 1991–1994, years during
which it was ascending instead of descending. The exit component did not follow the
same pattern, as it experienced only a significant increase in 1983 and has since been
growing rather similarly to manufacturing in general. The first two periods, in which
the entry component increased, correspond the mid-1980s changes in the market and
banking environment and the latter corresponds to the early 1990s depression, meaning
that during economic shocks the initial productivity of entering units tends to go up in
the transport equipment industry. Similar results are found in the period corresponding
the Great Recession as the entry component seems to be also ascending in the transport
equipment industry since 2009. The sudden increase in exits in 1983, on the other
hand, could tell about a single event that hit the industry so that the least productive
production units were forced to leave the market during a brief period. It is hard to
distinguish what this event might exactly have been, but likely that it was related to
the changes in the market and banking environment as was likely the ascent of the entry
component. In Section 5.2, it was also noted that the annual aggregate labor productivity
growth in the transport equipment industry had become larger than in manufacturing in
general since 1997, and that this was accounted by the within component until the last
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period 2008–2011. In the period 2008–2011, aggregate labor productivity growth is
rather accounted for by the between component, and net entry has also become more
significant. This is an interesting finding that could suggest that the Great Recession has
reawaken structural change in the transport equipment industry, even though later than
in other industries, in which it occurred already around 2002.
Continuing to the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machin-
ery and equipment industry, as was also mentioned in Section 5.2, saw its structural
change growth turn negative in 2007. The timing corresponds the Great Recession and
suggests that the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery
and equipment has been one of the industries that were most harshly hit by the re-
cession merely looking at structural change. The sector has experienced little creative
destruction since structural change slowed down around 2002, which could be thought
of as a adverse effect of the reawakening of creative destruction that occurred at the
time in other industries. In Section 5.2, it was noted that the aggregate labor productiv-
ity growth (as measured as an annual percentage on certain time intervals) was actually
higher in the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and
equipment industry in 1993–1996, 2002–2007 as well as in 2008–2011. The largest
difference between the furniture and other manufacturing industry as compared to man-
ufacturing in general lies in years 2008–2011, during which labor productivity growth
was negative for the manufacturing industry on the aggregate but positive for the fur-
niture and other manufacturing industry. Quite interestingly, the between component
in the sector was found approximately as significant as for manufacturing in general,
except for years 2008–2011, during which the between component was more significant
in manufacturing in general and while the net entry effect (thanks to a very positive exit
component) became clearly more significant for the furniture and other manufacturing
industry. It can be concluded that the furniture and other manufacturing industry is a
sector generally experiencing creative destruction, whereas after the Great Recession it
experienced more of the positive ’destruction’ instead of structural change.
Lastly, the evolution of all manufacturing industries (NACE 10–33) is also analyzed.
Like stated in Section 5.2, the shape of the entry component in Figure 5 exhibits an
acceleration in the descent around 1999 from which the descent is somewhat less pro-
nounced in 2005–2007 and then accelerates back to its prior growth rate since 2007. The
change in 2005–2007 could be interpreted as a reflection of the stagnant period which
is then followed by an increase in entry around the moment that the Great Recession
started (approximately in 2008). Comparing this to the evolution of the between com-
ponent as reviewed in Section 5.2, the creative destruction was noted to pass through
a corresponding stagnant phase from 2004 till 2008 in which the amount of structural
change stayed at its current level. The growth of the between component was also noted
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to have slowed down in 1997–1998, whereas the ascent of the entry component accel-
erated around 1999: less structural change in the period could, therefore, be explained
by the growing amount of entering units that affected the market through the entry in-
stead of the between component. While the between component and therefore creative
destruction was also noted to have slowed down in 1993–1995 and 2001–2002, there
were none clear changes in the entry component that would correspond this period.
In Section 5.2, it was also mentioned that the exit component was a steadily as-
cending slope respectively, with an acceleration in its ascent earlier than in the entry
component already around 1986. This could reflect the changes that happened in the
capital markets environment and the introduction of international trade as explained in
Section 1.1, which might have forced the least productive units to exit the market once
the competition between firms had become tougher and the markets more exigent than
when exporting to the Soviet Union. It results that the changes in the mid-1980s lead
into increasing market exit that then had a positive productivity effect on manufacturing
in general, starting in 1985 and enhancing in 1986 as shown in Figure 3. The exit com-
ponent was also perceived to accelerate and decelerate ending up at its initial level from
1994–1999 which could also be considered a sort of a stagnant phase, while around the
same time the between component had also slowed down in 1997–1998. Both the exit
and entry components accelerated in terms of descent and ascent respectively in 1999,
which could reflect changes in the manufacturing industries market that preceded the
dot-com bubble.
5.5 Creative destruction in recessions and the nature of the indus-
tries
One of the principal research topics in the study was the possible connection between
creative destruction and economic downturns. The study concentrated on four economic
downturns that have also been proved to have caused important shocks in productivity.
The aim was to find out whether there is evidence supporting the hypothesis according
to which the creative destruction process accelerates during and right after economic
shocks as suggested by theory. In terms of the time intervals, chosen as mentioned in
the introductory Section 1.1, the period in the mid-1980s seems to be the least significant
of the four time periods studied in terms of both labor productivity and creative destruc-
tion. The period corresponds the changes that occurred in the banking and market en-
vironment. On the other hand, the Great Recession seems to have triggered even larger
changes and more creative destruction than the early 1990s depression did. The dot-
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com bubble and the simultaneous productivity shock seem more significant for certain
sectors (such as the computer, optical and electronic products industry and machinery
and equipment) than for others. The aforementioned productivity shock started to af-
fect creative destruction slightly before the dot-com bubble and both of the shocks took
place in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The shocks might also have led to the reawak-
ening of creative destruction that happened in many sectors around the year 2002, while
in certain sectors creative destruction seems to have gained strength only after the Great
Recession had hit the economy around 2008.
Even though a clear, moderate-size productivity shock occurred in the manufactur-
ing industries in the mid-1980s, there seems to be little evidence supporting the idea
that the changes at the time would have directly either enhanced or reduced the creative
destruction process in any of the industries studied. In spite of the fact that no distinct
changes were identified, the creative destruction mechanism was noticed to have been
strong in the 1980s and to some extent also in the 1990s in sectors including the wood,
paper and printing industry and the rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic
mineral products industry. Furthermore, it was noted that the early 1990s depression
had a clear effect on the productivity of industries, such as the chemical and pharma-
ceutical products. However, in the case of the chemical and pharmaceutical products
industry, the shock in the 1990s affected the within component for the most part and
thus does not necessarily indicate creative destruction. In the rubber and plastics prod-
ucts, and other non-metallic mineral products industry as well as in the wood, paper and
printing industry, creative destruction seems to have played a central role until the early
1990s depression, but no longer since the depression. This leads to conclude that the
early 1990s depression actually might have even hindered creative destruction at least in
the case of certain industries. The early 1990s depression clearly affected productivity,
but might not have strengthened the creative destruction process in Finland, unlike the
Great Recession later did.
Previous research has found that there has been a so-called reawakening of the cre-
ative destruction mechanism in manufacturing since 2002. The evidence found in this
study also seems to support the idea that creative destruction gained strength around
2002, and clear signs of the phenomenon were found in the food products and bev-
erages, electronic products, machinery and equipment and textiles, wearing apparel,
leather and related products industries. The timing corresponds the productivity shock
in the change of the millennial, corresponding the dot-com bubble and a simultaneous
productivity shock that affected others than the ICT-sectors. It was also noted that the
furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment sec-
tor might have experienced an adverse effect, a slowdown in creative destruction, around
year 2002. Moving on to the fourth shock in the scope of the study, Finland is experienc-
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ing a gradual productivity slowdown as shown in Section 5.2, and its labor productivity
was particularly hit in 2008–2009 when the Great Recession had reached Europe (see
Figure 3). As mentioned, in the interval 2008–2011, the productivity growth had gone
down to 0%, the shock originating from a negative within component likely indicat-
ing that the financial crisis had caused an immediate negative effect on firms’ ability to
raise their productivity within production units. However, it was also noted that the net
entry effect and the between component were positive and actually smoothed out the
extremely negative productivity effects. The positive between effect and net entry effect
indicate that in manufacturing in Finland, the Great Recession clearly reinforced the
creative destruction process. The transport equipment industry was also found to expe-
rience a reawakening in its creative destruction around the time of the Great Recession
in 2008.
Next investigating the effects of the two recessions on the different sectors, the
chemical and pharmaceutical products industry seems to be the sector that most suf-
fered in terms of productivity after the early 1990s depression, while the food products
and beverages industry seems to have suffered from the depression relatively hard as
well. The transport equipment and the rubber and plastics products, and other non-
metallic mineral products industries seem to have suffered already during the depres-
sion in 1989–1992. On the contrary, the industries that most suffered from the Great
Recession were the wood, paper and printing industry and the computer, electronic and
optical products industry. Relative to other manufacturing industries, the food products
and beverages industry has managed to grow in terms of aggregate labor productivity,
regardless of the Great Recession and unlike manufacturing in general. The chemical
and pharmaceutical products, as well as the transport equipment industry, have also
been less affected than other industries in terms of productivity, and the furniture, other
manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment industry seems to
experience the same productivity slowdown as the nation does, but has not been hit very
hard by the early 1990s depression nor the recent financial crisis.
A central topic in the study was to examine the common nature and features in
the representative manufacturing industries. The study aims to explain the differences
in how different industries conduct with respect to productivity shocks by differences
in the nature of the industries in question. Looking at Table 1, it was first proposed
to classify the representative sectors by dividing them into capital and R&D-intensive,
capital but not R&D-intensive and into labor-intensive sectors.
According to the findings presented, the group ’capital and R&D-intensive sectors’
is the most varied of the three groups and covers industries with certain particularities
of their own. The within component seemed most determinative in the chemical and
pharmaceutical products industry, for which the net entry effect nor the between com-
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ponent were less important. The chemical and pharmaceutical industry does not func-
tion like the R&D-intensive in terms of structural change, and would rather correspond
the definition ’capital but not R&D-intensive’. On the contrary, the between component
indicating structural change (also referred to as creative destruction in this study) is sig-
nificant in all other three industries, especially in the electronic products industry and
in machinery and equipment but also to the same extent as for manufacturing in general
in the transport equipment industry. In the transport equipment industry, it looks like
the between component as well as the net entry has become more significant coming to
the last period 2008–2011, indicating that their contribution could be on the rise. The
net entry is especially significant in the electronic products industry, but not as much in
machinery and equipment. Looking at temporal differences among the R&D-intensive
industries, all sectors seems to conduct differently at different time periods. In the chem-
ical and pharmaceutical products industry aggregate labor productivity grew during the
period following the recent financial crisis 2008–2011, whereas the electronic products
industry suffered productivity losses in both 2008–2011 and 1997–2002, the latter cor-
responding the dot-com bubble. The machinery and equipment industry seems to have
suffered a little less than the electronic products industry during 2008–2011. The trans-
port equipment industry seems to have suffered the most from the productivity shocks
in the 1980s and 1990s and has recovered since the turn of the millennial.
There are several points in common for the group ’capital but not R&D-intensive
sectors’ (food products and beverages, wood, paper products and printing and rubber
and plastics and other non-metallic mineral products). Firstly, the between component
seems relatively insignificant for all the three combined sectors and all the time periods
studied. Secondly, aggregate productivity seems extremely dependent on the within
component and somewhat dependent of the net entry effect. The net entry effect is
positive and originates from a largely positive exit component. Looking at different
time intervals, the wood, paper products and printing industry seems to have a similar
evolution than the rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products
industry, both of which seem to have experienced strong creative destruction in the
1980s but not much since the early 1990s depression. However, the food products and
beverages industry does not seem to share the same temporal evolution and has actually
grown in productivity during the Great Recession while the two other industries have
rather suffered productivity losses.
Lastly, in the two labor-intensive industries studied, both the textile, wearing ap-
parel, leather and related products industry as well as the furniture, other manufactur-
ing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment industry seemed to depend on
structural change to the same extent than manufacturing industries do in general. In
other words, the between component showed as somewhat important in both industries
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and to the same extent on average in both industries over time. In the textile industry,
the effect of the between component was actually very significant during 2002–2007.
However, in the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and
equipment industry creative destruction (as measured by the between component) shows
even to have turned negative in 2008–2011, indicating that the financial crisis was a ma-
jor productivity shock in the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of
machinery and equipment industry but did not trigger structural change. The net entry
effect is relatively important to both industries as can be seen from the corresponding
tables. Aggregate productivity growth was more significant in the textile industry from
1997 to 2011 and in the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of ma-
chinery and equipment industry from 2002 to 2011 than in the manufacturing industry
in general. Both labor–intensive sectors seem to have evolved relatively similarly in
terms of aggregate labor productivity growth over the time period studied. Both have
been affected by structural change, but not more than manufacturing in general. Since
there are only two representative combined sectors in the labor-intensive sector group,
the results might not tell the entire truth. In any case, the textiles, wearing apparel,
leather and related products industry and the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and
installation of machinery and equipment industry do have some similarities.
Disregarding the temporal differences between the industries and the particular na-
ture of the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry, it seems like the common
feature among the R&D-intensive industries is significant structural change as measured
by the between component (unlike in the other two groups). In these industries, struc-
tural change plays an important role in contributing to aggregate productivity growth,
and the significance of the component could be on the rise. The possible effect of
entering and exiting units seems to vary among the different sectors, and no further
predictions regarding the net entry effect in R&D-intensive sectors can thus be made.
An alternative solution is to consider the second classification presented, which actually
seemed to bring up interesting similarities between the sectors.
According to the results concerning the division of the sectors into dependent on do-
mestic (consumption) demand and export demand, the food products and beverages in-
dustry was the single to be classified as clearly dependent on domestic demand. The rest
of the industries were classified as dependent on export demand. In export-dependent
industries, exports definitely seemed to explain aggregate labor productivity growth in
all sectors, but evidence supporting the idea that exports would explain structural change
was not found. However, many export-dependent sectors were found to experience lots
of structural change (with a few exceptions including the wood and paper industry was
found to have experienced more structural change previously and the rubber and plas-
tics industry experience less structural change overall) while the single consumption-
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dependent industry (the food products and beverages sector) was found to experience
growth in the within component, rather than in the between component.
Looking back at the merely capital-intensive sectors, which seemed the most uni-
form group in the first classification, capital-intensive industries do not seem to benefit
much from creative destruction in their productivity growth. It is also hard to make
predictions on the capital-intensive industries as such, since many of them are simulta-
neously extremely dependent on exports, producing a somewhat contradictory result. It
could also be that there are different subgroups with particularities within the export-
dependent industries, and that not all export-dependent industries experience lots of
structural change while the majority of them still do. For instance, it can be supposed
that among the export-dependent industries, the sectors that are also capital and not
R&D-intensive are less affected by structural change than other export-dependent in-
dustries. Due to the little amount of sectors included in the labor-intensive group (only
two) and the fact that they differed from each other in several aspects, this study does
not seem to particularly support the presumption according to which labor-intensive
industries would experience lots of creative destruction as such.
Due to the versatility of the results, it seems that neither the R&D-, capital- nor labor-
intensity of the sector seems to explain the results clearly. The aforementioned optional
classification was presented in sector 2, and finally only one sector was actually found
as dependent on domestic demand and all others as dependent on export demand. It
seems that the division into domestic and international target markets through growth
in exports and growth in private consumption within Finland describe the nature of the
industries at least as well or even better than the more typical division into capital-
intensive, R&D and capital-intensive and labor-intensive sectors often seen in current
literature. Nevertheless, in order to be able to confirm an actual dependence between
the within and between components and the export- or domestic demand-dependence
and thus make other further predictions, a more in-depth analysis would be required on
the subject.
The fifth research question also included reviewing whether the productivity slow-
down has affected some sectors driving the national growth rather than all manufactur-
ing sectors together. The productivity slowdown seems common in most sectors, but
not in all sectors as productivity actually seemed to have grown in the food products
and beverages industry, for instance. The productivity slowdown in manufacturing has
been definitely affected by the computer, electronic and optical products industry that
suffered great losses already at the time of the dot-com bubble and subsequently in the
Great Recession, as has the wood, paper and printing industry in the recent years. As
both of the sectors are known to be important exporting industries and also of significant
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size in Finland, it is likely that certain sectors have been affected more drastically by the
productivity slowdown, therefore, dragging down overall productivity correspondingly.
In some export-dependent sectors that would have otherwise experienced significant
structural change in the recent years, structural change might have slowed down due to
features such as high entry barriers as was considered in Section 2.3. High entry barriers
together with subsidies and policy measures complicating market exit for less productive
firms have been found to be probable causes reducing competition and slowing down the
resource reallocation process as compared to those in an economy without such barriers.
The result is that the productivity level of new entering firms tends to be artificially high
and that the productivity of continuing unit is unnecessarily low as they continue without
being forced to exit the market.
Instead of the amount of R&D in a sector, some differences in structural change
as well as differences in the sensitivity of an industry to changes in the global market
demand (export demand) might also be due to ease of funding in some sectors like, in
general, in the IT sector in which venture capital firms and investors are more likely to
invest in favorable economic periods. As capital-intensive investments tend to have a
much longer payback period and are often also extremely dependent on exports, they
might be less attractive to investors especially in times of economic difficulties such as
after the recent financial crisis. This corresponds the result that most other industries
exhibit a negative entry component like the theory suggests.
As was mentioned in Section 1.1, creative destruction is tightly linked to national
competitiveness and the ability of a country to produce in a cost-effective manner thus
raising its competitiveness in the global market. The cost-effectiveness of the country is
likely to start ameliorating at some time in the future, thus increasing exports. Finland
needs to augment its production in sectors producing products with high value added.
The structure of exports seems to be going into this direction, but currently there are not
enough of high value added products that pay well enough and that could be produced
at a competitive price in Finland. The current situation has accelerated the outsourc-
ing of production overseas, which partially explains the decrease in export shares and
export income in Finland. (Maliranta 2014b, 98.) Maliranta (2014b, 17) predicts that
if history repeats itself and the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry amelio-
rates thanks to a strong increase in productivity, the next economically preferable period
should come up around 2020. These ideas confirm the link presented between exports
and the structure of labor productivity.
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
Thanks to the economic shocks studied, the creative destruction process seems to have
gained strength most clearly in the start of the 21st century and to a smaller extent in
the end of the 20th century. Not all productivity shocks can be considered as enhancing
structural change, though. The Great Recession was the productivity shock that seems
to most have triggered creative destruction among the four shocks studied. In the 1980s,
the creative destruction process was enhanced in only a couple of sectors, and this might
not have been due to the productivity shock or even if it was, it only affected a small
part of the manufacturing sectors. The early 1990s recession might actually have even
slowed down the creative destruction mechanism, and the dot com bubble had signifi-
cant effects in certain manufacturing sectors while others were left unaffected. Creative
destruction has experienced a reawakening in Finland in the 2000s, and the negative
effect of the within component during the Great Recession was undoubtedly alleviated
by creative destruction accompanied with a positive net entry effect. Summing up, the
Great Recession has definitely triggered creative destruction. There is evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that economic downturns at least occasionally accelerate the creative
destruction mechanism in some sectors, but not all shocks in the entire manufacturing
industry. While the Great Recession accelerated creative destruction in manufacturing,
this can not be extended to all productivity shocks in general, as the effects of the other
economic downturns on creative destruction remain unclear.
In terms of productivity, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry was the sec-
tor that suffered most in the early 1990s recession, but this was principally due to a
negative within component slowing down its aggregate productivity growth. The food
products and beverages industry also suffered productivity losses among with other in-
dustries slightly before and during the recession. In the Great Recession, the wood and
paper products, and printing industry together with the computer, electronic and optical
products industry have seen their productivity growth be slowed down drastically, both
sectors that are or have been strongly affected by creative destruction. On the other
hand, the food products and beverages industry has managed to grow its labor produc-
tivity during the latest crisis, and the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry has
also suffered less than manufacturing sectors overall. The aforementioned sectors are
one of the sectors least affected by creative destruction.
To determining the nature of the representative sectors, two alternative classifica-
tions were proposed. The first was to divide the sectors into capital and R&D-intensive,
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capital but not R&D-intensive and into labor-intensive sectors, and the second to divide
the sectors dependent on domestic demand and on export demand. Strong structural
change was found to be the point in common among the R&D-intensive sectors, as it
was found to contribute significantly to the aggregate labor productivity growth in three
out of four representative sectors. For the capital but not R&D-intensive sectors, the
between component seemed relatively insignificant and especially so in the last decade.
In the case of the labor-intensive sectors, no clear connection between labor-intensity
and creative destruction was found, but the sectors seemed to be somewhat affected by
creative destruction and net entry.
Classifying the sectors into those dependent on domestic demand and on export
demand instead and focusing on differences especially around the time of the Great
Recession, only the food products and beverages industry was found as clearly depen-
dent on domestic demand. This might thus explain its recent labor productivity growth
regardless the recession. In the empirical analysis, export growth appeared to explain
aggregate labor productivity growth in export-dependent sectors, but creative destruc-
tion was not found directly dependent export growth. Nevertheless, most of the export-
dependent sectors were found to experience lots of structural change with the exception
of the aforementioned capital and not R&D-intensive industries, which did not expe-
rience creative destruction like other export-dependent industries did. The sectors that
have most suffered from the productivity slowdown lately are also extremely dependent
on exports. A combination of the two classifications is therefore suggested as the most
accurate way to determine the nature of manufacturing sectors in terms of productivity.
The productivity slowdown seems to be a common feature of most but not all sectors,
driven by productivity losses in large export-dependent industries such as the wood and
paper products, and printing industry and the computer, electronic and optical products
industry. The dependence of the industry on either exports or on domestic demand might
be a key factor explaining the differences between the representative sectors in different
industries. The thesis confirms the many previous findings such as the reawakening
of creative destruction in the early 2000s. Even though creative destruction was not
found to be directly dependent on exports, the alternative classification sheds light on
the differences among the sectors and serves as an interesting starting point for grouping
the sectors in an alternative way as opposed to previous classifications proposed in the
literature. Looking at the net entry, it also seems like the ’destructive’ effect of creative




Based on the theoretical background and empirical research, creative destruction has
been growing for the last 30 years and will also likely continue strong in the following
years. Among others, the increasing significance of the between component serves
as an indicator of accelerated creative destruction. After the reawakening of creative
destruction in 2002, the creative destruction mechanism went through a stagnant period
before the Great Recession and is again clearly on the rise since 2008. The wood, paper
products and printing as well as the rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic
mineral products sectors were found to be the industries that have most suffered since
the Great Recession and also seem to be experiencing less creative destruction than they
have in the previous decades. It can be suspected that the lack of creative destruction
might be one of the causes due to which the industries have experienced less significant
productivity growth lately. The findings also support the idea that creative destruction
results in enhanced productivity growth of a sector, having done so especially in the
Great Recession. Thus, the natural creative destruction process should be made possible
by eliminating all institutional barriers that might be hindering it.
Even though aggregate labor productivity and exports seemed to go hand in hand,
no evidence was found supporting the idea that structural change would depend on ex-
ports, leading to consider that it is rather aggregate labor productivity that is affected
by the principal target market of the sector, and not its underlying components. Never-
theless, export dependence showed to be a useful alternative way to classify the nature
of sectors experiencing different kind of productivity growth and creative destruction.
Looking back at the first classification presented, the chemical and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts industry, which should be a very R&D-intensive industry, experienced only little
creative destruction. This is one of the principal findings leading to consider that struc-
tural change does not depend, at least not completely, on the R&D-intensity of a sec-
tor. Capital but not R&D-intensive industries were the most compatible group in the
classification, suggesting that capital-intensity might be a functional way to classify a
certain type of sectors. Several sectors, in which creative destruction previously played
a central role but in which the within component has become more and more signifi-
cant, were identified. While the relation between high tech industries with lots of R&D
and intangible capital did not seem clear for some industries, sectors like machinery
and equipment and optical, electronic and computer products seem to exhibit a strong
connection as they experience lots of creative destruction, have particularly productive
entrants coming in the market and thus creating a positive net entrance effect, and are
extremely R&D-intensive. It is also important to also note that sectors can experience
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positive productivity growth without experiencing creative destruction. Cumulative pro-
ductivity growth revealed that the food products and beverages sector had been best off
after the Great Recession and this was merely due to within effect, as the sector was
found to experience only little creative destruction.
The study provides a relatively comprehensive overview of the structural change as
well as on aggregate productivity in the representative manufacturing sectors studied.
Though not a central theme studied in the thesis, the net entry effect in different sectors
also seems to shed light on the structure of productivity growth in manufacturing. The
significance of net entry has grown in the last period studied, 2008–2011, and in some
of the sectors already previously. This could also be interpreted as a possible sign of
accelerated creative destruction, which first shows in statistics as a increase in the pos-
itive exit effect, an increase in the so-called ’destruction’ side. The coming years show
whether this grown importance of the net entry effect actually translates into creative
destruction.
6.3 Propositions for future research
In the study, it was noted that some sectors, such as the furniture, other manufacturing;
repair and installation of machinery and equipment sector, might have experienced some
type of adverse creative destruction around the year 2002, during which the mechanism
has been accentuated in many industries. The possibility of a slowdown in structural
change should be investigated in greater depth in order to find out the underlying causes
of such adverse creative destruction. Comparing the industries with adverse creative de-
struction to industries that have experienced strengthening in creative destruction could
also shed light on the underlying causes of the process.
This study was limited to only four economic shocks that were known to have caused
a simultaneous productivity shock. Three of the shocks were found clearly significant
in terms of productivity and creative destruction, but other interesting points in time
worth studying could be found by enlarging the time span. It would also be possible to
consider quarterly instead of annual data and concentrate on the recent years to find the
exact timing of the changes found in this study, enabling to see better whether some of
the changes actually have been simultaneous or subsequent. In addition, studying the
latest years 2011–2016 could also be informative for the sake of making predictions on
the current situation.
Especially the relationship between exports and different manufacturing industries,
that arose during the study, would also require more specific analysis in order to find
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out whether exports actually explain structural change, what other factors might both
exports and structural change be influenced by and what kind of relationship does the
principal market of the industry actually have with its likelihood to experience creative
destruction. An interesting comparative study further exploring the theme would be to
compare the dependence of the within component as compared to the between compo-
nents on exports. The differences between the different sectors in terms of dependence
on exports could also be studied more precisely by comparing exports to different areas
(for instance to the European Union, to the United States and so on).
It is also possible to study the between component more in detail: the between com-
ponent can be decomposed further on into the entry effect and the exit effect (separate
from the entry and exit component). One example of this has been done by Maliranta
(2014b, 36–37) dividing the between component into the ’creation side’ and the ’de-
struction side’. The creation side consists of the entry component and continuing units
augmenting their working hours (the entry component plus the entry part of between)
while the destruction side consists of the exit component and those continuing units that
are decreasing their working hours (the exit component plus the exit part of between).
Working hours can be interpreted as augmenting or decreasing the labor input share.
For the moment, only a few applications of such further decompositions are known.
Piekkola & Åkerholm (2013, 431) provide an alternative by dividing the firms studied
into two groups, firms that are more productive than other firms on the average and firms
less productive than other firms on the average. They then study the changes in labor
input shares (the between component) separately for those two groups.
A last theme left aside is studying whether firm age dynamics explain the sensitivity
of the sectors studied to either domestic or export demand, and whether entry and exit
barriers together with other institutional factors slowing down creative destruction, such
as ease of accessing funding during different economic times, differ between the sectors
studied. For instance, the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry could be ex-
periencing little creative destruction due to extremely high regulation of all activities in
the sector. Firm age dynamics could also be investigated by comparing the early 1990s
depression and the Great Recession in terms of whether there were more young firms
entering the market, often considered as most vulnerable to economic crisis, at the time
in the sectors that most suffered productivity-wise.
Although creative destruction still seems a subject that has gained relatively little
importance in productivity literature, there seems to be a lot more into it unlike has been
thought previously and the mechanism is definitely on the rise. The sensitivity of labor
productivity in different sectors to exports was investigated and brings up a new point
of view into the existing research on the theme. As a last recommendation, the more
precise component specific analysis of labor productivity is most certainly suggested
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APPENDIX I: SECTORS
In this appendix, we present the results of the regression analysis which was conducted
as described in Section 5.3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ** indicates
significance at the 95 % level (p 6 0.05) while *** indicates significance at the 99 %
level (p < 0.01).
Table 13: Aggregate labor productivity growth in different industries
explained by exports growth
intercept b p-value R2 Adj. R2
(std. error)
Textiles 0.0378 0.3390 0.0000*** 0.3992 0.3815
(0.0097) (0.0713)
Wood 0.0189 0.5974 0.0000*** 0.4661 0.4504
(0.0149) (0.1097)
Chemicals 0.0460 0.2005 0.0249** 0.1393 0.1140
(0.0116) (0.0855)
Rubber 0.0308 0.4207 0.0000*** 0.5026 0.4880
(0.0098) (0.0718)
Electronics 0.0187 0.6001 0.0000*** 0.4685 0.4529
(0.0149) (0.1096)
Machinery 0.0268 0.5089 0.0000*** 0.4923 0.4774
(0.0121) (0.0886)
Transp.eq. 0.0265 0.4124 0.0001*** 0.3587 0.3398
(0.0129) (0.0946)
Furniture 0.0409 0.3163 0.0000*** 0.4069 0.3895
(0.0089) (0.0655)
Manufacturing 0.0271 0.5063 0.0000*** 0.6316 0.6208
(0.0090) (0.0663)
Number of observations in all industries: 36
** = p 6 0.05, *** = p < 0.01
In Table 13, ’Textiles’ refers to the textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related
products industry, ’Wood’ to the wood and paper products, and printing industry,
’Chemicals’ to the chemical and pharmaceutical products industry, ’Rubber’ to the
Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products industry, ’Elec-
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tronics’ to the computer, electronic and optical products industry, ’Machinery’ to the
machinery and equipment industry, ’Transp. eq.’ to the transport equipment industry,
’Furniture and other’ to the furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation of
machinery and equipment industry and finally ’Manufacturing’ to the manufacturing
industry overall.
Table 14: The between component of labor productivity in the transport
equipment industry and in the manufacturing industry overall explained
by exports
intercept b p-value R2 Adj. R2
(std. error)
Transp.eq. 0.0097 -0.0234 0.0386** 0.1199 0.0940
(0.0015) (0.0109)
Manufacturing 0.0098 -0.0223 0.0511** 0.1074 0.0811
(0.0015) (0.0110)
Number of observations in both industries: 36
** = p 6 0.05
Figure 17: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in textiles, wearing ap-
parel, leather and related products
Figure 18: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in wood and paper prod-
ucts, and printing
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Figure 19: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in chemical and pharma-
ceutical products
Figure 20: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in rubber and plastics
products, and other non-metallic mineral
products
Figure 21: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in computer, electronic
and optical products
Figure 22: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in machinery and equip-
ment
Figure 23: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in transport equipment
Figure 24: Exports regressed on structural
change (between component) in labor pro-
ductivity in transport equipment
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Figure 25: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in all manufacturing
Figure 26: Exports regressed on structural
change (between component) in labor pro-
ductivity in all manufacturing
Figure 27: Exports regressed on aggregate
labor productivity in furniture; other man-
ufacturing; repair and installation of ma-
chinery and equipment
